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THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA: PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND 
THE EVALUATION OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 
 
Dana Carver Boehm∗ 
 
Buoyed by advances in forensic science, the number of 
postconviction exonerations has significantly risen in the American 
criminal justice system over the last twenty years. The ethical obligations 
of prosecutors faced with such claims, however, have not kept pace. Most 
efforts within district and U.S. attorneys’ offices have been incremental 
at best, and even those few prosecutors’ offices with more robust 
“conviction integrity units”—units that affirmatively investigate claims 
of actual innocence and seek to mitigate the likelihood of wrongful 
convictions in the first place—suffer from various structural defects. 
Often a prosecutor’s default posture when faced with a claim of actual 
innocence is to defend the guilty verdict as quickly and efficiently as 
possible.  
There is good reason for prosecutors to be skeptical of inmate 
innocence claims. Those prisoners who raise postconviction claims of 
actual innocence largely lose, and rightfully so; for many, perhaps most, 
pursuing habeas relief is a matter of routine that follows the exhaustion 
of appeals. But however understandable prosecutors’ skepticism, it 
comes at a cost: the actually innocent often are grouped together with 
the frivolous filers and face the same mountain of prosecutorial 
noncooperation notwithstanding the merits of their claims. This is the 
new “prosecutor’s dilemma”: how to honor the commitment to doing 
justice by way of postconviction review without wasting precious 
resources on frivolous petitions. 
This Article provides a framework to assist prosecutors in 
separating the actually innocent from the masses of nonmeritorious 
postconviction challenges, and in ratcheting down the prosecutorial zeal 
reflexively associated with these challenges. The proposed framework, 
called “tiered review,” takes a pragmatic approach to postconviction 
review, setting up a multistage process by which prosecutors weed out 
meritless postconviction petitions early on and then apply increasingly 
intensive levels of scrutiny to the claims of innocence. Under tiered 
review, a prosecutor’s office investigates a petitioner’s innocence claim 
if that person can point to some new evidence (broadly defined) of 
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innocence, drops its opposition to the petitioner’s claim should that 
investigation demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” and 
affirmatively supports the petitioner’s exoneration effort where the 
investigation yields “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner 
was wrongfully convicted. Drawing on extensive interviews with 
prosecutors from conviction integrity units in Dallas County, Texas; 
Harris County, Texas; New York County, New York; Santa Clara 
County, California; and Cook County, Illinois, tiered review illustrates 
how changes in office culture and the structure of postconviction review 
can mitigate inherent biases that make objective postconviction review 
so challenging. And while the proposal discussed below does not 
purport, as no proposal can, to eliminate the prosecution of the innocent 
entirely or to discover every convicted innocent, it does provide a 
feasible mechanism whereby prosecutorial zeal and discretion can be 
directed toward the most ethical and professionally responsible ends. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2011, the Virginia Court of Appeals exonerated forty-six-year-
old Thomas Haynesworth, formally acknowledging that he had spent twenty-seven 
years behind bars for a crime he did not commit. Haynesworth’s release from 
prison was not the direct result of exonerating DNA, an eyewitness recantation, an 
assertion of a constitutionally deficient trial, or revelations of police or 
prosecutorial misconduct. Haynesworth’s pro bono counsel made a compelling 
argument for his innocence,1 but as a minority of the Virginia Court of Appeals 
made clear in a vigorous dissent, Haynesworth almost certainly would not have 
been found innocent but for the avid support of then-Virginia Attorney General 
Ken Cuccinelli, who had affirmatively joined Haynesworth in his petition for a 
writ of actual innocence.2  
Like Cuccinelli, prosecutors across the country have the power and influence 
to free from prison this country’s convicted innocent.3 Nevertheless, in the vast 
majority of documented exonerations, prosecutors have vigorously opposed the 
habeas petitions of the wrongfully convicted—sometimes for decades—before 
ultimately agreeing to the prisoners’ release, if they ever agree at all.4 
                                                     
1 The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project and Hogan Lovells US LLP jointly represented 
Haynesworth in his actual innocence petition. The Author, then the lead associate of Hogan 
Lovells’ pro bono department, assisted in Haynesworth’s case from 2010 to 2011. 
2 Haynesworth v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 817, 818 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (Elder, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no direct evidence that exonerates Haynesworth. The Attorney 
General has merely expressed his opinion that Haynesworth is innocent.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
3 While prosecutors have no statutory authority to order a prisoner’s release, when the 
very arm of the state responsible for the initial imprisonment of that individual renounces 
its conviction, proclaims that individual’s innocence, and seeks that person’s release, it 
stands to reason that courts would not object.  
4 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors have consented to 
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Haynesworth is not, unfortunately, unique: a recent survey suggests that since 
1989, the United States has seen 873 prisoners exonerated as actually innocent of 
the crimes for which they were convicted.5 Given that the vast majority of these 
exonerations are DNA-based, most assume that this number—or any other 
wrongful conviction estimate—represents only a fraction of those prisoners 
wrongfully incarcerated.6 If, as is commonly asserted, it is better for some number 
of guilty to go free than to convict a single innocent person,7 there is a clear need 
for a mechanism that would help prosecutors distinguish meritorious claims of 
innocence from the unmeritorious. 
In the face of these conviction errors, it is tempting to blame the prosecutors. 
But while a natural prosecutorial zeal for maintaining convictions may play a role 
in the reflexive resistance to actual innocence claims,8 a far more important and 
pragmatic reality is at play: prosecutors confront a massive number of 
postconviction challenges, the overwhelming majority of which are, in fact, 
frivolous. For every Thomas Haynesworth, there are many more Ray Dansbys (a 
convict who claimed actual innocence despite the fact that multiple witnesses, 
including his son, watched him shoot his ex-wife multiple times at point blank 
range)9 and Edwin Marreros (a convict who, after exhausting his appeals and 
habeas remedies, filed a pro se actual innocence claim that made no real argument 
                                                     
DNA tests in less than fifty percent of the cases in which testing later exonerated the 
inmate.”).  
5 SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.la 
w.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf. 
The accuracy of exoneration figures is always somewhat controversial, particularly where 
non-DNA cases are included. In some respects, the 873 figure is conservative, as it 
excludes “group exonerations” that have gained widespread public attention and typically 
involve mass police misconduct, such as those seen in Tulia, Texas; Dallas, Texas (the 
“Sheetrock Scandal”); and Los Angeles, California (the “Rampart Scandal”). Id. at 3, 80–
90. The Innocence Project also keeps a frequently updated tally of exonerations in which it 
is involved, which typically involve DNA, on its website. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); see also Samuel R. Gross et 
al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
523, 524 (2005) (noting an earlier tally from the authors of the National Registry of 
Exonerations Study); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1553 
nn.15–16 (2008) (discussing the empirical studies related to this topic). 
6 GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 3; JIM PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE: 8 
MYTHS THAT LEAD TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 97 (2011); Glenn A. Garber & Angharad 
Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence Claims, 239 N.Y.L.J. 1, 3, Apr. 4, 
2008, available at http://www.glenngarber.com/common/pdf/GarberActualInnocence.pdf.  
7 See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (citing 
various authors that have expounded on Blackstone’s original quote). 
8 See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004). 
9 See Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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for innocence but necessitated a response nevertheless).10 This tension is the new 
“prosecutor’s dilemma”11: how to honor the prosecutor’s commitment to doing 
justice by identifying the convicted innocent, without wasting precious resources 
on largely frivolous petitions.  
This Article prescribes a systematic framework to mitigate the problems 
associated with the new prosecutor’s dilemma, a framework that allows 
prosecutor’s offices to review actual innocence claims, particularly where DNA 
evidence is not available.12 Using existing conviction integrity units as a case 
study, the Article advocates for a postconviction review regime—called “tiered 
review”—that is structured to foster innocence seeking, openness, and objectivity 
and is guided by concrete standards of review that apply to each case and are to be 
applied by each prosecutor. Systematized postconviction review along these lines 
not only strikes a good balance between prosecutors’ ethical obligations and 
budgetary constraints but also would facilitate consistent review that also is better 
suited to prosecutors’ role as ministers of justice. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I.A analyzes prosecutorial 
postconviction ethical obligations as presently required by law, specifically 
                                                     
10 See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2012). 
11 See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishment, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 107–09 (2003) (referring to the prosecutor’s choice either to 
agree not to prosecute a culpable cooperating witness to secure conviction of certain other 
guilty defendants or to prosecute the potential cooperating witness and lose the ability to 
prosecute other guilty defendants); Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? 
How the Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 
513, 537 (2012) (describing the “prosecutor’s dilemma” as the difficult choice “to refuse to 
prosecute more cases than the system can handle justly . . . or to bring cases without regard 
for resources in order to satisfy society’s increasingly punitive appetite”); Amy Ma, Note, 
Mitigating the Prosecutors’ Dilemma in Light of Melendez-Diaz: Live Two-Way 
Videoconferencing for Analyst Testimony Regarding Chemical Analysis, 11 NEV. L.J. 793, 
802–03 (2011) (describing the “prosecutors’ dilemma” as the quandary prosecutors face in 
deciding whether to expend the significant resources and logistical challenges inherent in 
presenting the live analyst testimony now required in cases requiring scientific analysis, or 
simply not to prosecute many of these cases).  
12 This Article focuses largely on the efforts of district attorneys’ offices. These 
prosecutors are responsible for far more criminal prosecutions than the federal government, 
and many operate in states that offer postconviction remedies based on actual innocence 
(the Supreme Court has refused to recognize such a claim at the federal level). H. Geoffrey 
Moulton, Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special Prosecutors: An 
Organizational Perspective, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 79, 95 (2000). Nevertheless, this 
Article purposefully uses the broader term “prosecutors,” because the ethical obligations 
that apply to district attorneys apply equally to federal prosecutors, because these 
prosecutors encounter the same postconviction challenges (though on a smaller scale, 
perhaps, given the lack of a judicial remedy), and because in the District of Columbia 
federal prosecutors do engage in the prosecution of nonfederal crimes and are obligated to 
respond to claims under the District of Columbia’s actual innocence statute. See Fran 
Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the 
Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 310 (2010). 
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analyzing prosecutors’ ethical obligations with regard to their review of actual 
innocence claims. The latest iteration of the Model Rules has attempted to provide 
some direction to prosecutors who face ethical questions regarding convictions 
already obtained, but the majority of states have no ethical guidelines in this 
context whatsoever. Part I.B then summarizes the descriptive and prescriptive 
scholarship on postconviction ethics. Scholars addressing these questions have 
largely analyzed the cognitive biases causing prosecutorial resistance to innocence 
claims, as well as the circumstances under which a prosecutor might affirmatively 
assist in an inmate’s exoneration efforts.13 No one, however, has attempted to 
develop a decision-making framework for prosecutors’ offices to employ in 
responding to claims of actual innocence.  
Part II presents five case studies that serve as the partial basis for the tiered 
review approach described in Part III. Relying on extensive interviews with 
prosecutors in conviction integrity units in Dallas County, Texas; Harris County, 
Texas; New York County, New York; Santa Clara County, California; and Cook 
County, Illinois, Part II summarizes the lessons to be learned from the practice of 
systematized postconviction review.  
Part III presents the Article’s main practical and intellectual contributions: (1) 
a series of structural changes to the way that postconviction review is conducted, 
and (2) the concept of “tiered review,” or the use of a series of concrete standards 
to assess and respond to claims of actual innocence. To counterbalance the natural 
resistance prosecutors feel toward innocence claims, postconviction review must 
be integrated into the office structurally, in three ways: (1) a management-level 
prosecutor must direct the review of innocence claims; (2) the review must be 
performed by someone other than the original prosecutor; and (3) the office must, 
with specific exceptions outlined below, cooperate with inmates by opening case 
files and approving requests for DNA testing.  
These structural changes, however, are incomplete without the concept of 
tiered review. Under tiered review, a prosecutor assesses whether a claim meets a 
particular standard of proof before investing further resources in reviewing the 
claim. The tiers function as follows: The review of an initial claim of actual 
innocence is subject to the office’s usual protocols, as modified by the structural 
changes just described. That process will, without more, result in a denial of the 
claim. However, when a petitioner presents new evidence that introduces a bona 
fide issue as to the petitioner’s innocence, the office will investigate that claim. If 
the investigation demonstrates a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” the office 
will drop its opposition to the claim. And finally, in the event that the investigation 
yields “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner was wrongfully 
convicted, the office will affirmatively support exoneration for the petitioner.  
Part IV identifies and responds to counterarguments against investing in 
postconviction reform, arguing that adoption of the proposed structural changes 
                                                     
13 See, e.g., David Luban, Lecture, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 16–17 (2010); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After 
Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 175 (2005). 
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and tiered review are realistic—and potentially inevitable—prospects for the 
majority of prosecutors’ offices. Part IV also shows how postconviction review 
may be instrumental in remedying some of the most serious criminal justice issues 
for today, including mass incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system. 
Before proceeding, there are two caveats. First, while tiered review and the 
associated structural modifications presented here can be applied broadly by 
prosecutors’ offices across the country, the proposals are clearly aspirational in 
nature. By proposing a structure that requires significant additional effort and 
resources from prosecutors’ offices across the country, the proposal likely will be 
subject to criticism for being overly burdensome. At the same time, by attempting 
to make the burden of reviewing postconviction actual innocence claims 
manageable and practicable for prosecutors, it is likely also to be criticized by 
innocence advocates for being underinclusive in terms of its ability to detect the 
claims of the convicted innocent. Such is the nature of proposals aimed at 
addressing the problem of wrongful conviction. Professor Fred Zacharias, the first 
scholar to engage the question of postconviction prosecutorial ethics, observed: 
 
At best, one can only hope to identify considerations, reasons, or ways of 
analyzing appropriate conduct by prosecutors. The absence of legal 
constraints eliminates the possibility of defining clearly correct, or 
incorrect, behavior. Similarly, a consensus regarding particularized ethics 
rules is unlikely to develop. In most cases, the conflict between the 
presumption of guilt and seemingly “fair” prosecutorial conduct is 
strong, thus rendering any resolution debatable.14 
 
The resolution proposed below is, without question, debatable. The aim of 
this Article is not to prescribe a definitive solution, but to advance the current 
conversation beyond postconviction prosecutorial ethics and the prosecutor’s role 
in restoring justice to the wrongfully convicted to discussion of the specific steps 
those prosecutors can and should take in doing so. 
Second, some may argue that because the number of convicted innocent is 
relatively small, devoting finite resources to the problem of wrongful conviction is 
misguided, particularly given the scale of other criminal justice problems like mass 
incarceration and racial injustice. But this argument misses the point. There is no 
question that mass incarceration is, as William Stuntz called it, “the criminal 
justice crisis of our age”15 and that it disproportionately has impacted the United 
States’ minority populations.16 But these problems are all related. Systematized 
                                                     
14 Zacharias, supra note 13, at 175. 
15 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 246 (2011). 
16 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 54–57 (2012); BRUCE 
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3–4 (2006); Ian F. Haney Lopez, 
Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2010). As of 2006, black men were six to eight times more likely 
to be incarcerated than whites, an incarceration trend that does not appear closely 
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postconviction review can lead to broader improvements to prosecutorial culture; 
reorienting prosecutorial culture to justice seeking through use of a postconviction 
review framework can also benefit larger criminal justice problems, including 
mass incarceration and racial injustice. Like wrongful conviction, mass 
incarceration and racial injustice are tied in part to misused prosecutorial authority. 
While postconviction review is not a magic bullet for either mass incarceration or 
racial injustice, the improvements to prosecutorial culture that attend that reform 
have far-reaching consequences for other problems as well.  
 
I.  PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
 
Prosecutorial ethics have long been a topic of scholarly discussion, but in the 
postconviction context, this discussion has resulted in very few concrete legal 
rules. Part I.A lays out the law on postconviction ethics, the whole of which 
amounts to a model rule that only eight state bars have adopted.17 Because so few 
states have adopted rules on postconviction prosecutorial ethics, most prosecutors 
are left to rely on their overinvoked but nebulously defined role as “ministers of 
justice,” a role which scholars have in recent years parsed closely in the 
postconviction context.  
Part I.B outlines the scholarship on prosecutorial postconviction ethical 
obligations, which is much more developed than the current law: scholars have 
explored the existence of a prosecutorial postconviction ethical obligation,18 
investigated why wrongful convictions occur and how they can be avoided,19 and 
analyzed the specific steps prosecutors should take to remedy existing wrongful 
                                                     
correlated with crime rates. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 31 (2009). 
17 As of May 2012, the ABA reports that Idaho adopted Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h) 
without modification, and Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin have adopted modified versions of the rule. AM. BAR ASS’N, CPR POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT RULE 3.8(G) AND (H), at 1 (2012) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/3_8_g_h
.authcheckdam.pdf. As of that report, ten jurisdictions were studying the rule to determine 
whether adoption would be desirable. Id. (noting Alaska, Arizona, California, the District 
of Columbia, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). In July 
2012, New York also adopted Model Rule provisions 3.8(g) and (h) in modified form. See 
N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., COURT NOTICES 119 (2012), available at http://www.daasny.or 
g/Court%20Notices%20Rule%203.8.pdf.  
18 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-
Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 481 (2009); Luban, supra 
note 13, at 16–17; Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to 
the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 55–57 (2009); 
Medwed, supra note 8, 132; Zacharias, supra note 13, at 175. 
19 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 165–69 (2011). See generally GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5. 
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convictions.20 This Article is an attempt to bridge these three scholarly efforts by 
constructing a concrete postconviction review framework that would satisfy 
prosecutors’ postconviction ethical duties in a way that is not only effective in 
remedying wrongful convictions but also practical, effective, and capable of 
widespread implementation. 
 
A.  The Governing Postconviction Ethical Standards 
 
Prosecutors’ ethical obligations are set forth in federal and state statutes and 
regulations, the Constitution, case law, and state bar rules of professional 
conduct;21 but virtually none of these bodies of law imposes any postconviction 
ethical obligations. The exception to this rule is Model Rule 3.8, provisions (g) and 
(h), which, to date, only eight states have adopted.22 Those provisions are 
“standards meant to be the bare minimum, not to establish the full scope of 
prosecutors’ responsibility.”23 For prosecutors in all other states, the only 
postconviction ethical direction is the mandate to act as “ministers of justice,”24 a 
vague duty referenced by the Supreme Court and the Model Rules,25 and one 
which essentially results in the matter being entirely subject to prosecutorial 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW’S CONVICTION INTEGRITY 
PROJECT, ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 4–
5 (2012) [hereinafter INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT] (outlining five specific practices 
prosecutors should adopt in order to ensure conviction integrity), available at http://www.l 
aw.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Progr 
ams_FinalReport_ecm_pro_073583.pdf; Medwed, supra note 8, 169–80; Medwed, supra 
note 18, 58–65; Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We 
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2215, 2238–52 (2010); Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the 
Importance of Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1033, 1033–50 
(2012) (detailing creation of and specific innocence cases handled by the Dallas County 
Conviction Integrity Unit). 
21 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: 
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 
(1993) (discussing the adoption of the ABA’s Model Rules and suggesting that the trend 
toward specificity in lawyer regulation may go too far). 
22 ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 1; see also David Keenan et al., The Myth of 
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional 
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 203, 227–28 (2011) (noting earlier data indicating only five states having adopted 
Model Rules provisions 3.8(g) and (h)). Unlike most Model Rules amendments, which 
originate with the American Bar Association, Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h) was the product 
of “reasoned debate” among New York prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges 
regarding prosecutors’ ethical obligations upon discovery of new evidence that would call 
into question a conviction. Id. at 232. 
23 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 472–73. 
24 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013). 
25 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013). 
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discretion. As a result, individual prosecutors typically determine what their 
postconviction ethical obligations are on a case-by-case basis, without the 
guidelines of a formal ethics rule or, often, clear instruction from their chief 
prosecutor.26  
 
1.  The Baseline for Prosecutorial Postconviction Ethical Obligations: Minimalist 
Ethical Principles Established by the Model Rules Are a Baseline, Not a Standard 
 
Most state bars have chosen to impose no concrete postconviction obligations 
on their prosecutors.27 Even in those few states whose bars have adopted Model 
Rule 3.8(g) and (h),28 the requirements imposed on prosecutors are fairly minimal. 
Indeed, like all formal ethics rules, Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h) set a floor of 
conduct, falling below which may result in professional discipline—not an ethical 
standard for the virtuous prosecutor to follow.  
Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h) states,  
 
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material 
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did 
not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the 
prosecutor shall: 
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or 
authority, and 
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s 
jurisdiction, 
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless 
a court authorizes delay, and 
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable 
efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the 
defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did 
not commit.  
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence 
establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was 
convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor 
shall seek to remedy the conviction.29 
 
                                                     
26 See Michele K. Mulhausen, Comment, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States 
Should Adopt ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 309, 309 (2010). 
27 See Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 
2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 463–500 (2009). 
28 Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and 
Wisconsin have adopted the rule in some form or another. ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 
1. 
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)–(h) (2013). 
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Notably, these provisions require no affirmative action on the part of the 
prosecutor upon mere receipt of a claim of actual innocence. The provisions do not 
apply at all unless the prosecutor already knows exculpatory information, which 
must be “new” and create “a reasonable likelihood” that a defendant was 
wrongfully convicted. In other words, the prosecutor is under no obligation to 
affirmatively consider an inmate’s innocence claim, even where a prosecutor 
strongly suspects (but does not “know”) that additional evidence may exist that 
would call that person’s conviction into doubt. Nor does it impose an obligation to 
engage in good-faith, objective review of postconviction claims, whether in the 
habeas or innocence context. Instead, these provisions set a “high threshold” for 
prosecutorial postconviction action.30 But “the disciplinary standard was not 
intended to imply that when exculpatory evidence does not achieve that level of 
significance, it should be ignored.”31 Rather, proponents of the rule assumed that 
prosecutors would engage in some degree of scrutiny and investigation in order to 
explore innocence claims and determine whether the evidence in question was 
significant enough to require disclosure under the rule.32 Thus far, that has not 
proven true, either in or out of states that have adopted the Model Rules provisions. 
Model Rules provisions 3.8(g) and (h) represent an important step forward in 
identifying that the prosecution does have some obligation following conviction 
and in setting a baseline standard of proof for prosecutors to follow when they do 
encounter potentially exonerating evidence. But they fail to impose any obligation 
on prosecutors to actually review the many claims of innocence that cross their 
desks or to give those claims anything more than a perfunctory, skeptical review. 
Although there are no concrete rules mandating good-faith prosecutorial review of 
innocence claims, the obligation of prosecutors to serve as “ministers of justice” 
would appear to mandate just that type of review. Indeed, while few concrete rules 
govern prosecutors in the postconviction context, their aspirational obligation to 
serve justice likely requires more. 
 
2.  The Aspirational Role of Prosecutors in Effecting Postconviction Justice 
 
Beyond the Model Rules, the “law” mandating prosecutorial postconviction 
conduct is effectively nonexistent. Given the longstanding prosecutorial mandate 
to “serve justice,” it would seem that prosecutors are obligated to act more 
proactively than the Model Rules suggest where innocence claims are concerned. 
But to call the charge to “serve justice” a legal standard to guide prosecutors 
reviewing actual innocence claims is to overstate its usefulness. As Professor 
David Luban observed, “[T]here is no consensus about what justice is, and we 
have every reason to doubt there ever will be.”33 Indeed, there is no reason to 
assume that prosecutors who have fought these petitions through to the bitter end 
                                                     
30 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 511. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 511–12. 
33 Luban, supra note 13, at 20.  
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are not motivated by a desire to serve justice. Justice, as a guide for prosecutorial 
action, provides no analytical power that can guide a conscientious prosecutor in 
the review of claims of actual innocence.  
This lack of guidelines is problematic given the incentives prosecutors have to 
maintain a conviction regardless of the merits of the innocence claim before them. 
While prosecutors generally aspire to seek justice, their default response to 
postconviction innocence claims is often characterized by reflexive skepticism and 
strenuous resistance, a reflex generated by the importance of conviction statistics 
for raises, recognition, and district attorney politics; social pressure from police 
officers and other prosecutors; the fact that most such claims are baseless; and the 
importance of giving finality to victims and the public.34 Although the law requires 
little of prosecutors following a guilty verdict, the prosecutor’s obligation to ensure 
that “guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer”35 suggests that prosecutors should 
play a proactive role in exonerating the convicted innocent.  
In other words, prosecutors operate under an ongoing obligation to justice, an 
obligation that does not terminate upon receipt of a jury verdict. As stated by the 
National District Attorneys Association, “The primary responsibility of 
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.”36 Of course, “justice” is a 
somewhat imprecise guideline for prosecutorial conduct, and reliance on that term 
for day-to-day prosecutorial decision making essentially has left difficult ethical 
questions to be decided by individual prosecutors, who are making these decisions 
based on their individual moral compasses and the exigencies of limited resources. 
Part III of this Article parses what “justice” may require of prosecutors in the 
postconviction context. 
 
B.  Postconviction Prosecutorial Ethics Scholarship 
 
The role of prosecutors in postconviction relief has been a hot topic in legal 
academia since at least 2005, when Professor Zacharias first suggested that 
prosecutors’ “minister of justice” role may require them to proactively engage 
actual innocence claims even after the rendering of a guilty verdict. The 
scholarship largely has followed three paths: (1) an exploration of the existence of 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 475–76; Medwed, supra note 8, 
at 134–48. 
35 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (specifically referencing the U.S. 
Attorney); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612–13 (1999) (detailing the historical roots of the prosecutor’s 
role to “seek justice”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. 
This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that . . . special precautions are 
taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”). 
36 NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1-1.1 (3d 
ed. 2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%2 
0Revised%20Commentary.pdf.  
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a prosecutorial postconviction ethical obligation,37 (2) an investigation of why 
wrongful convictions occur and how they can be avoided (an inquiry which 
necessarily involves the role prosecutors can play in avoiding and remedying 
wrongful convictions),38 and (3) a discussion and analysis of the specific steps 
prosecutors are now or should be taking to remedy existing wrongful 
convictions.39  
Following Professor Zacharias’s groundbreaking 2005 article, Professors 
Bruce Green, Daniel Medwed, and Ellen Yaroshefsky, among others, began 
exploring the contours of a prosecutor’s postconviction ethical responsibilities.40 
This scholarship not only makes a strong case for the existence of an affirmative 
postconviction ethical obligation but also promotes a view that where claims of 
innocence are involved, justice-minded prosecutors should work hand in hand with 
defense lawyers and the Innocence Project in objectively assessing those claims.41 
Professor Zacharias identifies a variety of scenarios in which a prosecutor may be 
obligated to investigate an innocence claim,42 Professor Medwed suggests 
prosecutors should create internal structures in order to do just that,43 and 
Professors Green and Yaroshefsky articulate the circumstances under which a 
prosecutor should actively support an innocence claim, even articulating a specific 
standard that prosecutors should employ in doing so.44 This Article pushes this 
scholarship still further, identifying specific practices and standards of review to be 
used in efficiently weeding out valid innocence claims from among the frivolous. 
Professors Brandon Garrett and Samuel Gross have compiled a number of 
surveys that not only attempt to grasp the scope of this country’s wrongful 
conviction problem but also to draw conclusions regarding the most prominent 
                                                     
37 See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 41; Luban, supra note 13, at 16–
17; Medwed, supra note 18, at 55–57; Zacharias, supra note 13, at 176. 
38 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 19, at 6–11; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 1–
5. 
39 See, e.g., INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT, supra note 20, at 4; Medwed, supra note 8, 
at 130–32; Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38; Scheck, supra note 20, at 216–18; Ware, 
supra note 20, at 1049–50. 
40 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Hyland Hunt, The Prosecutor and Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence: DNA and Beyond, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771, 771–72 
(2010); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 467–73; Medwed, supra note 8, at 130–32; 
Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38. 
41 See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 516; Luban, supra note 13, at 16–
17. 
42 Zacharias, supra note 13, at 176. 
43 Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38, 58–65 (citing examples of effective prosecutorial 
postconviction review, including that by the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit, 
United Kingdom Criminal Cases Review Commission, and the North Carolina Innocence 
Inquiry Commission).  
44 See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 495–508. This Article parses that 
standard in Part III.B. 
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contributing factors to wrongful conviction.45 Reviewing the data from these 
studies indicates that a high correlation exists between wrongful conviction and 
eyewitness identification, unsubstantiated confessions, government informant 
testimony, or non-DNA forensic analysis of physical evidence.46 These 
conclusions not only allow prosecutors and police to improve preconviction 
procedures for bringing charges, but they provide prosecutors flags for wrongful 
conviction that prosecutors may rely on as part of their postconviction review 
protocol.47 
Finally, a growing number of scholars are applying a pragmatic approach to 
prosecutorial postconviction ethics, exploring the specific steps prosecutors are 
now or should be taking to remedy existing wrongful convictions.48 Scholars like 
Professor Medwed and Professor Rachel Barkow posit concrete, practical 
suggestions for prosecutors’ offices to implement in improving prosecutorial 
objectivity,49 while practitioners like Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project and 
Michael Ware (formerly of the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit) discuss in 
concrete terms how best to counteract natural prosecutorial inclinations toward 
upholding conviction, using specifically Dallas’s Conviction Integrity Unit as an 
example of the innovations possible in a prosecutor’s office.50 Likewise, this 
Article draws upon the experiences of Dallas and four other conviction integrity 
units to identify innovations in postconviction review that comply with 
prosecutors’ postconviction ethical obligations and also are practical and palatable 
to prosecutors and, therefore, may be of interest to other prosecutors. 
This Article builds on and bridges the important scholarship described above, 
making several unique contributions to the literature on the prosecutors’ role in 
postconviction review of actual innocence claims. First, as just discussed, this 
Article canvasses five functioning conviction integrity units, gathering information 
that is, for the most part, not publicly available but that is essential for identifying 
feasible ways in which prosecutors can play a role in exonerating the convicted 
innocent. Second, this Article distills from the practices of conviction integrity 
units principles that encourage objective prosecutorial review and can be broadly 
applied in prosecutors’ offices across the country, large or small, cash strapped or 
                                                     
45 See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 6–13; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 40 
(highlighting factors associated with exonerations); PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6, at 115.  
46 See Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial 
Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2928 (2009). 
There is a significant volume of high-quality scholarship exploring the common causes of 
wrongful conviction and identifying those listed here as some of the most prevalent causes. 
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 19, at 8–11; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 40. That 
discussion is outside the scope of this Article, but in the past five years, there have been 
several very interesting statistical analyses done on this topic.  
47 See infra Part III.B. 
48 See, e.g., Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250–51; Ware, supra note 20, at 1049–50. 
49 See Medwed, supra note 8, at 169–181; Medwed, supra note 18, at 58–65; 
INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT, supra note 20, at 4–9. 
50 Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250; Ware, supra note 20, at 149–50. 
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well funded. Third, this Article fills a gap not only in the scholarship but in 
prosecutorial practice, by combining these principles with clearly articulated 
standards of proof that would assist prosecutors in determining whether additional 
action in investigating or responding to an innocence claim is appropriate. This 
final innovation is important for a number of reasons: improving consistency in 
office responses to innocence claims, assisting prosecutors in fulfilling their duty 
to serve justice, and ensuring that office resources are expended under 
circumstances the chief prosecutor has determined are appropriate and in a way 
that will distinguish valid innocence claims from the significant number of 
frivolous ones efficiently. 
 
II.  THE PRACTICE OF POSTCONVICTION REVIEW 
 
As mentioned above, this Article is not the first to identify the need to address 
postconviction ethics. And indeed, other scholars have relied on innovative efforts 
in the Dallas and New York County district attorney’s offices to create a system 
for evaluating innocence claims and preventing wrongful conviction.51 Part II goes 
further than these previous efforts, presenting the first in-depth evaluation of five 
such efforts—known as “conviction integrity units”—operating throughout the 
country.52 The conviction integrity units reviewed in Part II—Dallas County, 
Texas; New York County, New York (“Manhattan”); Harris County, Texas; Santa 
Clara County, California; and Cook County, Illinois, based on interviews with the 
directors of each unit or other senior prosecutors in the office53—reveal not only 
important basic principles but also notable absences of standardized review within 
or among prosecutors’ offices. The lack of clearly articulated standards of proof 
that would guide prosecutorial discretion—or a reliance on “gut feeling” for 
                                                     
51 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 494; Scheck, supra note 20; Ware, supra 
note 20, at 1034.  
52 Because information on prosecutorial decision making and methodology is, 
generally, not publicly available, gathering information regarding postconviction review 
regimes is a challenge. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 58 (1998) (noting that public access to 
information regarding prosecutorial practices has “not expanded since the 1820s”). 
Because the American prosecutor, as Angela Davis has observed, both is “the most 
powerful official[] in the criminal justice system” and wields its power with vast, 
unreviewable discretion, the dearth of publicly available information on how prosecutors 
exercise that discretion is troubling from a constitutional rights and transparency 
perspective and from a government efficiency perspective. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, 
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2009). 
53 The information in Part II is a product of interviews with the directors of the Dallas 
County, Harris County, and Santa Clara County conviction integrity units. Information 
regarding Manhattan’s conviction integrity unit was obtained by interviewing a senior 
assistant district attorney in the office (the unit director was on vacation), and information 
regarding Cook County’s program was obtained through an interview with Fabio Valentini, 
the immediate supervisor of the conviction integrity unit director and the chief of Cook 
County’s Criminal Bureau. 
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identifying a valid innocence claim—leaves even the efforts of these highly 
effective conviction integrity units vulnerable to individual prosecutorial biases 
and potential discrimination. Where Part I presents the legal and scholarly efforts 
to understand postconviction ethics, Part II provides the practical context gleaned 
from the five units highlighted herein. This context makes clear the need for and 
benefits of the proposal in Part III. 
 
A.  Case Studies in Conviction Integrity Unit Implementation 
 
1.  Dallas County District Attorney’s Office 
 
In the wake of a series of embarrassing public exonerations, Dallas County 
residents elected Craig Watkins district attorney on a platform of restoring 
integrity to the district attorney’s office.54 Watkins pulled his first assistant, Terri 
Moore, from private practice and immediately implemented a new approach to the 
problem of wrongful conviction.55 They studied the county’s wrongful convictions, 
reviewing them in the same way that the Federal Aviation Administration 
investigates an airplane crash scene, working backward from the wrongful 
conviction to see what malfunction in the system caused that result.56 Watkins also 
hired an innocence project attorney to form a “Conviction Integrity Unit,” which 
would review postconviction claims of actual innocence, and he assigned the unit 
an additional prosecutor, paralegal, and investigator, all of whom would work on 
postconviction claims of innocence full time.57 While many innocence statutes bar 
those who have pled guilty, lack new evidence, or are no longer incarcerated from 
filing a claim of innocence,58 Dallas County’s Conviction Integrity Unit decided to 
                                                     
54 For decades before Watkins’s election, the county had been infamously resistant to 
innocence claims. See John Buntin, 2008 Public Officials of the Year: Exoneration Man, 
Craig Watkins, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/poy/Craig-Watkins.html (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2014). Despite resistance to DNA testing on the part of Watkins’s 
predecessors, by the time Watkins took office as district attorney in 2007, Dallas County 
had already seen nine DNA exonerations—more than any other county in the United 
States. Ware, supra note 20, at 1035. The county’s tenth, eleventh, and twelfth 
exonerations came during Watkins’s first weeks in office. Id. (citations omitted). 
55 Ware, supra note 20, at 1039. The Thin Blue Line, a 1988 documentary depicting 
the wrongful conviction of Randall Adams who initially received a death sentence, presents 
a particularly disturbing account of Dallas County justice under long-time district attorney 
Henry Wade. See generally THE THIN BLUE LINE (1988). 
56 Ware, supra note 20, at 1039. 
57 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 259; Ware, supra note 20, at 1034, 1040–41. 
58 Texas has not adopted an actual innocence statute. Rather, the exclusive 
postconviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of 
habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 11.07, § 5 (West Supp. 2012) 
(“After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other 
proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner”). Texas 
courts have, however, recognized a freestanding innocence claim through habeas 
jurisprudence for inmates who can produce new evidence of innocence. See, e.g., Ex parte 
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review all claims of actual innocence, from misdemeanors to major felonies, 
regardless of how old the case.59 Further, the unit would not use as its touchstone 
the rather stringent standard applied by Texas courts for determining whether a 
petitioner is actually innocent.60 Indeed, the only real restriction employed by the 
office would be a jurisdictional one: the conviction must be a Dallas County 
conviction.61 Announcement of the unit’s creation was greeted by a massive flood 
of innocence claims from prisoners across Texas and the country, numbers which 
have since tapered off to fifteen to twenty new claims a week.62 
Watkins also decided to reverse the office’s longstanding opposition to DNA 
testing, implementing a policy of supporting testing if there was relevant biological 
evidence to test and the outcome of that test was potentially dispositive on the 
issue of guilt or innocence.63 In the two years following that policy change, nine 
people were exonerated.64 Although inmates have no right to postconviction 
discovery in Texas, as in virtually every state across the country, Dallas County 
also adopted an “open file” policy of providing requesting inmates with access to 
prosecution files.65 While the open-file policy is not without some limits (e.g., 
inmates making an Eighth Amendment claim may be asked which particular 
portions of the file are relevant to the claim),66 generally, where allegations like 
prosecutorial misconduct are made, the trial file is readily provided to the 
requesting party.67 Early on, Dallas also began a collaborative review of its DNA 
case files with the Innocence Project of Texas, in which, upon a showing of a 
“plausible claim of innocence,”68 Dallas would provide the Innocence Project the 
prosecution’s entire file, including work product.69 This practice, among others, 
                                                     
Duke, No. AP-76762, 2012 WL 1059895, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2012) 
(unpublished decision). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first articulated its innocence 
standard for noncapital cases in Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996). Under that decision, a petitioner “must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted [the applicant] in light of the new evidence.” Id. 
at 212 (Baird, J., concurring). While that standard still holds sway for noncapital cases, the 
Texas legislature has altered that standard for capital cases. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN., art. 11.071 (West 2012). 
59 See Telephone Interview with Russell Wilson, Conviction Integrity Unit Chief, 
Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Wilson Interview]. 
60 See id.; see also Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 212. 
61 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
62 Id. 
63 Ware, supra note 20, at 1039. 
64 PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6, at 208. 
65 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. (noting that upon instituting the open-file policy, the office soon discovered 
that providing the trial file to every requester was more costly than anticipated). 
68 Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250.  
69 Id. Scheck also cited the Conviction Integrity Unit’s willingness to investigate leads 
proposed by the inmate claiming innocence where the unit is uniquely situated to pursue 
those leads; the unit’s willingness to allow the Innocence Project or other inmate lawyers to 
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led Barry Scheck, cofounder of the Innocence Project, to actively promote the 
Dallas model as “the most prominent and successful model for a Conviction 
Integrity Unit.”70 
Just as Watkins began his tenure by reforming and updating office policies on 
Brady71 disclosures, eyewitness identifications, and police lineups, the Conviction 
Integrity Unit continued to review closely its exonerations for ways to improve 
office procedure.72 All of the exonerations uncovered to date were obtained under 
prior district attorneys, but where the attorneys who prosecuted the cases still work 
in the DA office, they are notified of the exoneration and its cause, and if 
appropriate, additional steps to reform office procedure may be taken.73 Moreover, 
to ensure unbiased review of an innocence claim, the initial prosecuting attorney 
typically plays only a limited role in the postconviction review process.74 Where 
the innocence claim alleges a Brady violation, the original prosecutor almost 
certainly will receive an inquiry about disclosures;75 however, if the convicted 
individual claims an eyewitness misidentification, the office believes there is little 
reason to consult with the original prosecutor.76 
Watkins was well aware that he risked the disfavor of Dallas County’s veteran 
prosecutors by instituting a conviction review program. Indeed, “more than 200 of 
the 267 attorneys [in the office] had actively campaigned for his opponent” in the 
election, believing Watkins lacked sufficient trial experience to be district 
attorney.77 “It’s difficult,” Watkins acknowledged. “I still walk around the office 
gently because I know there are a lot of people who still don’t want me here.”78 
Watkins had to work hard to ensure his Conviction Integrity Unit was not 
marginalized within the office. Structurally, he ensured the unit was integrated 
with the already-existing units that were likely to have overlapping cases and that 
these divisions (appellate and writ) would operate under the direction of the head 
                                                     
investigate leads those entities are uniquely situated to pursue; the unit’s ongoing, close 
working relationship with the public defender’s office, which includes a willingness to 
freely exchange information and to engage in joint investigations; and the unit’s formal 
adoption of Model Rule 3.8 as official policy. Id. at 2250–51.  
70 Id. at 2250. 
 71 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
72 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. The new office policy regarding Brady, 
implemented during Watkins’s tenure, specifies that a prosecutor may be fired if the Brady 
violation is sufficiently egregious. See id. 
73 Id. According to Russell Wilson, no prosecutor currently with the office has had a 
wrongful conviction that was the product of prosecutorial misconduct. The majority of 
wrongful convictions have been the product of an erroneous eyewitness identification or 
similar error, often linked with insufficient prior office protocols, which have since been 
revised during Watkins’s tenure. See id.  
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 Buntin, supra note 54. 
78 Id.  
2014] THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA 631 
of the unit.79 The head of the Conviction Integrity Unit is number three in the 
office in terms of authority, reporting directly to the district attorney, and, by virtue 
of this seniority, would ensure the office’s exoneration-focused policies would be 
implemented actively in all divisions.80  
Even more critical to office morale has been the successful discovery and 
exoneration of many convicted innocent individuals, validating the work of the 
unit and underscoring the reality of the wrongful conviction problem. Dallas 
County’s rapid reform of office culture may in part be a function of its initial focus 
on DNA cases, where exonerations can be quick, straightforward, and 
indisputable.81 These decisive, conclusive, and unquestionable exonerations 
demonstrated clearly the importance of the team’s work to prosecutors in the office 
and the importance of having such a unit as part of the office’s core mission.82  
 
2.  Harris County District Attorney’s Office 
 
Pat Lykos, then-district attorney for Harris County, Texas, set up that office’s 
Post-Conviction Review Unit in 2009, having run for office on a platform of 
reform.83 Harris County has “a reputation as one of the harshest prosecutorial 
jurisdictions in the state,”84 leading the country in sending defendants to death 
row.85 Indeed, since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976, 
                                                     
79 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. Henry Wade, Dallas’s district attorney from the 1950s through the 1980s, 
made preservation of DNA evidence office policy. As a result, Dallas had a massive cache 
of DNA cases to use at the outset of its conviction integrity efforts. See Michael Graczyk, 
After Dallas DA’s Death, 19 Convictions Are Undone, USA TODAY (July 29, 2008, 1:54 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-29-2653195694_x.htm.  
82 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59 (noting that starting with the DNA cases 
“cleared the path” in terms of establishing the necessity of the Conviction Integrity Unit). 
83 See Telephone Interview with Baldwin Chin & Alicia O’Neil, Post-Conviction 
Review Unit, Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (July 21, 2012) [hereinafter Chin & 
O’Neil Interview]. Lykos’s predecessor, Chuck Rosenthal, resigned in 2008 after having 
been caught sending racist and pornographic e-mails from his work account (Rosenthal had 
survived a crime lab scandal four years earlier which resulted in nearly four hundred 
prisoners being entitled to new DNA testing). Ben Crair, Pat Lykos: Texas’ Capital 
Punishment Avenger, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 
2011/04/04/pat-lykos-texas-capital-punishment-avenger.html. 
84 Brandi Grissom, An Interview with Harris County DA Pat Lykos, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 
27, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-news-media/tt-interview/an-interview-with-h 
arris-county-da-pat-lykos/. 
85 Id. Johnny Holmes was an iconic Texas prosecutor, from his handlebar mustache to 
the 111 defendants he sent to death row between 1992 and 2000 alone. See Brandi 
Grissom, A Tough Prosecutor Finds His Certitude Shaken by a Prisoner’s Exoneration, 
TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/library/multimedia/john-bradley-t 
exas-prosecutor-asserts-change-of-heart/. Nor did Holmes give any breaks to lesser 
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Harris County—the third largest county in the nation (it includes the city of 
Houston)86—has sent more prisoners to the death chamber than any state in the 
country.87 
Lykos is no liberal (she is a self-described “Goldwater-Reagan 
Republican”),88 but nevertheless has instituted dramatic change within the Harris 
County District Attorney’s Office.89 Among these reforms was her institution of a 
Post-Conviction Review Unit, which she staffed with two experienced prosecutors 
from within the office and an investigator.90 Lykos explained her decision to 
institute the new Unit: 
 
I think every major district attorney’s office needs it. We have 50,000 
felony cases a year filed in Harris County on average and over 80,000 
misdemeanor cases. You can’t have that volume without errors being 
made. . . . Public trust and confidence in the system is everything. If 
you’re to have civil order, you have to have the public trust the system. 
They have to have confidence that it’s fair, that the law is applied 
equally.91 
 
The Innocence Project of Texas has lauded creation of the new unit,92 and in 
the first three years of its existence, the unit has played a leading role in the 
exoneration of three convicted innocents.93 Since announcing its postconviction 
                                                     
criminals: he once sought a life sentence for a substitute teacher who sold a joint to a 
student. Crair, supra note 83.  
86 Grissom, supra note 84.  
87 Crair, supra note 83. 
88 Id. 
89 Lykos introduced a series of reforms that angered law enforcement, such as 
“extending leniency to first time DWI offenders and people caught with trace amounts of 
cocaine.” See Doug Miller, GOP Voters Reject Lykos, Choose Anderson in Harris County 
DA Race, KHOU 11 NEWS (May 29, 2012, 11:13 PM), http://www.khou.com/news/politics 
/Lykos-loses-to-Anderson-in-GOP-race-for-DA--155569755.html. “During [Lykos’s] first 
weeks in office, many longtime prosecutors left the DA’s office,” and “dozens of past and 
present prosecutors supported [Anderson, Lykos’s opponent] and showed up at 
[Anderson’s] election night victory party.” Id. Her reforms, along with her management 
style, ultimately led to her defeat in the May 2012 district attorney primary (her term ended 
in December 2012). See id.  
90 Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. The prosecutors both had rotated through 
multiple divisions in the Harris County District Attorney’s Office and already had 
established credibility as prosecutors; neither felt as though they were viewed or treated 
any differently (i.e., as office ombudsman) by virtue of their move to the Post-Conviction 
Review Unit. Id. 
91 Grissom, supra note 84. 
92 See Peggy O’Hare, For Inmates, Proving Innocence Remains Uphill Battle, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/For-inmates-pro 
ving-innocence-remains-uphill-1711959.php. 
93 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
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review program, Harris County has been besieged by claims of actual innocence, 
the vast majority of which are baseless. There have been “[l]ots of frivolous 
claims,” Lykos has commented. “But we review everything.”94 Unlike the 
conviction integrity units in other jurisdictions, Harris County limits its review to 
cases with the potential to yield definitive forensic confirmation of innocence.95 
Harris County’s Post-Conviction Review Unit is tasked with responding to letters 
claiming actual innocence plus all requests for postconviction DNA.96  
Harris County’s policy on postconviction file sharing also differs from Dallas 
County’s. Unlike Dallas, Harris County does not open its files to unrepresented 
inmates.97 But once an inmate has been appointed an attorney (which happens in 
all DNA testing requests that qualify under the postconviction DNA testing statute 
and many innocence claims with a forensic component), the office will permit the 
attorney to see the parts of the file relevant to the requested DNA or forensic 
testing.98 Like with the other conviction integrity units, guilty pleas, expiration of 
statutes of limitation, misdemeanor offenses, or lack of a judicial remedy are not 
considered bars to review.99 If an exoneration would require the unit to make a 
credibility determination (such as in a case of witness recantation), however, the 
investigation ends there: the office views this type of determination as within the 
province of a jury and therefore outside the purview of prosecutorial review.100 In 
the unit’s view, the proper venue for those cases is the court system, where a judge 
can make the required credibility determination.101 Of course, the initial innocence 
claim itself often does not provide sufficient information to determine whether 
conclusive, objective exonerating forensic evidence exists or whether reliance on a 
credibility determination ultimately would be required. Therefore, the unit may 
still review a claim that lacks an express tie to forensics in an initial claim. 
The Post-Conviction Review Unit has instituted several structural protections 
to preserve its independent judgment. As in Dallas, the unit reports directly to the 
district attorney and her first assistant, and is only accountable to them.102 Second, 
for those cases in which investigation is warranted, the unit avoids discussing the 
investigation with the original prosecutor of the case until the investigation 
(including witness interviews and forensic testing) is complete and the unit has 
made its own preliminary assessment.103 For those cases that appear to be headed 
in the general direction of a new trial or exoneration, however, the office views 
                                                     
94 O’Hare, supra note 92.  
95 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.  
96 The Post-Conviction Review Unit is responsible for responding to requests for 
DNA testing, but unless a credible claim is made that the evidence will be of an 
exonerating nature, the office enforces the limits of the statute as written. Id.  
97 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
98 See id; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64 (West 2003). 
99 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
100 Id.  
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
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consultation with the original prosecutor as an essential part of the process, as the 
prosecutor may have information not reflected in the paper files. And if the case is 
headed toward exoneration, consulting with the prosecutor is the best way to 
confirm the unit’s investigation has been thorough.104 Equally importantly, 
including the prosecutor in the conversation helps ensure the unit does not come to 
be viewed as the office auditor, indiscriminately searching for the arguably 
innocent.105 
 
3.  New York County (Manhattan) District Attorney’s Office 
 
When Cyrus R. Vance Jr. assumed his post as Manhattan district attorney in 
January 2010, he replaced Robert Morgenthau, who had served as the Manhattan 
district attorney for thirty-five years and established what many considered “the 
country’s premier prosecutorial office.”106 Vance began his legal career in the 
Manhattan district attorney’s office in the 1980s, and even then the office had a 
unique culture that favored exoneration.107 When Vance came to office, he built on 
this tradition, initiating a Conviction Integrity Program with a two-fold purpose of 
preventing wrongful convictions on the front end of the criminal justice process 
and addressing claims of actual innocence on the back end.108 
Vance set up Manhattan’s Conviction Integrity Program in March 2010, a 
program with three main components: a Conviction Integrity Committee, a 
conviction integrity chief, and an outside Conviction Integrity Policy Advisory 
Panel.109 The committee, comprised of ten senior members of the district 
                                                     
104 Id. 
105 See id. 
106 Press Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Robert M. Morgenthau Receives New York 
State Bar Association’s 2011 Gold Medal (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.nysba.or 
g/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=6708.  
107 Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney, Conviction Integrity Conference 
Speech, New York University (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://manhattanda.org/convictio 
n-integrity-conference-speech (referencing how each new attorney was told about the 
Wylie-Hoffert murder case, in which the district attorney developed doubts about a detailed 
confession to a brutal murder and spearheaded a far-reaching reinvestigation which 
ultimately led to the suspect’s exoneration).  
108 Id. Because this Article is directed at postconviction review efforts, it focuses its 
analysis on what the Manhattan district attorney’s office calls the “back end” of its 
Conviction Integrity Program. 
109 The Advisory Panel consists of leading criminal justice experts, including legal 
scholars like Bruce Green and Rachel Barkow, former prosecutors, and Innocence Project 
Co-Founder Barry Scheck, who together advise the office on national best practices and 
evolving issues in the area of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. CNTY. 
DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://www.manhattanda.org/wrongful-conviction (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014); Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, N.Y.C. DA Vance 
Announces Conviction Integrity Program (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter N.Y. Cnty. ADA 
Press Release], available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
a.dgerEtktWA. 
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attorney’s staff, focuses on the front end of the process, reviewing and revising 
practices and policies related to training, case assessment, investigation, and 
disclosure obligations, with a particular eye for the most common errors leading to 
wrongful conviction, such as eyewitness misidentification and false confessions.110 
While Manhattan has long required its prosecutors to comply with rigorous 
checklists to ensure justice on the front end of the criminal justice process, and had 
long required its prosecutors to be convinced of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
prior to proceeding with a prosecution, the committee, upon its inception, engaged 
in further development of these checklists to specifically address the problem of 
wrongful conviction.111 These detailed checklists have two virtues for prosecutors: 
helping to ensure the defendant in the case is the actual perpetrator and assisting 
prosecutors in making a stronger case against the actual perpetrator.112 For 
instance, because eyewitness misidentification is a common contributor to 
wrongful conviction,113 in cases involving only one eyewitness, Manhattan 
prosecutors use an office-created checklist on the types of corroborative evidence 
for which they should look. These checklists both bolster cases and serve as a 
reminder that extra care is required in that particular type of case to avoid wrongful 
conviction.114 Likewise, the committee updated the office’s checklists for Brady-
disclosure obligations, reminding prosecutors of what types of material they should 
be looking for and specific places where they should be looking.115 For all of these 
materials, the committee relied on the latest research put together by cognitive 
scientists and other empirical analysis done by its Advisory Panel members.116 
These advisors also play an ongoing, albeit largely intermittent, advisory role for 
Manhattan’s Conviction Integrity Program, where the conviction integrity chief 
seeks their advice on an ad hoc basis as specific issues arise that are relevant to 
their expertise.117  
As another component of this front-end process, Manhattan revised its 
training regime to incorporate best practices for avoiding wrongful convictions, 
adding a “conviction integrity” component to each of its major training sessions.118 
New Manhattan prosecutors are trained on how to recognize the warning signs of a 
wrongful conviction,119 using real cases in which the office discovered a wrongful 
                                                     
110 Wrongful Conviction, supra note 109. 
111 See Telephone Interview with Manhattan Assistant District Attorney, (July 6, 
2012) [hereinafter Manhattan ADA Interview]. 
112 Id. 
113 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 48–50, 80. 
114 See Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
115 Id.; see also Vance, Jr., supra note 107. 
116 See Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
117 See id. 
118 Vance, Jr., supra note 107. 
119 Id.; see also DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO 
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 133 (2012) (advocating training as one way to 
mitigate the occurrence of wrongful conviction). 
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conviction as models.120 The office intentionally selected innocence cases in which 
very senior, and very well respected, assistant district attorneys in the office had 
been fully convinced that they had the right person, only to later discover they 
were wrong.121 By using these types of cases for training purposes, not only are 
prosecutors made more attuned to and aware of warning signs, but the realization 
that senior, well-respected prosecutors could have made this mistake increases the 
focus of young prosecutors on avoiding the error, underscores the message that it 
could happen to anyone, and removes in part the stigma of a discovery of this kind 
of error, thereby improving objectivity for the postconviction review process.122  
For his conviction integrity chief, Vance tapped a senior assistant district 
attorney, Bonnie Sard, who had been at the Manhattan district attorney’s office 
since 1994 and was highly respected within the office.123 In her capacity as 
conviction integrity chief, Sard coordinates the committee’s activities and leads 
reinvestigation of any case that appears to present a meaningful claim of actual 
innocence.124 Like Dallas, Manhattan has no real limitations on the types of claims 
it will review; it simply asks applicants to specify what evidence they have of 
innocence and how the district attorney’s office would be able to look further into 
that evidence.125 The office does not necessarily consider a guilty plea as a bar to 
review, so long as there is a plausible explanation of why the defendant pled 
guilty; but it does view the existence of a guilty plea as an important factor to 
consider when evaluating a claim of actual innocence.126 Likewise, Manhattan 
does not use the legal parameters of the state innocence statute (which authorizes a 
motion to vacate a conviction on the basis of new evidence)127 to set the 
parameters of the unit’s initial review because, as one assistant observed, it is 
“hard to know on the front end [of an investigation] where you’ll be on the back 
end.”128 In other words, while new evidence may be a statutory requirement, its 
lack does not bar review of the innocence claim by the Manhattan office, as 
exonerating new evidence often may be uncovered over the course of an 
investigation. 
Postconviction claims of actual innocence go directly to the Conviction 
Integrity Program, where they are logged, tracked, and receive an initial review by 
                                                     
120 See Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. 
123 Vance, Jr., supra note 107; Meet the Executive Team, N.Y. CNTY. DIST. 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://manhattanda.org/meet-executive-team (last visited Apr. 19, 
2014); N.Y. Cnty. ADA Press Release, supra note 109. 
124 N.Y. Cnty. ADA Press Release, supra note 109. 
125 See Wrongful Conviction, supra note 109. 
126 Vance, Jr., supra note 107. 
127 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(b)(i)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2013) (“The court 
shall deny any [motion to vacate a sentence] made pursuant to this paragraph where . . . the 
defendant’s motion . . . does not seek to demonstrate his or her actual innocence . . . .”). 
128 Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
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Bonnie Sard.129 Unlike in Dallas, however, in Manhattan, the prosecutor who 
originally tried the case does play a role in the review process.130 In most instances, 
Sard consults with the prosecuting attorney as part of her initial review of the case 
and, if she is convinced that there has been no miscarriage of justice, she forwards 
that conclusion directly to the district attorney.131 Also unlike the Dallas conviction 
integrity regime, in Manhattan, the assistant district attorneys who conduct any 
required reinvestigation into a claim of innocence are not devoted full time to the 
conviction integrity team. Rather, if Sard determines further investigation of a 
claim is needed, she forwards the claim to an assistant district attorney, who will 
manage the reinvestigation of the case along with the rest of her caseload.132 That 
assistant district attorney will then report her conclusions back to Sard, who 
determines whether additional review is necessary; Sard then reports the decision 
to the district attorney.133 In cases where a full-scale investigation is conducted, 
which often takes from six to twelve months, the Conviction Integrity Committee 
will meet and review the assistant’s findings upon conclusion of the investigation, 
often for several hours.134 In those instances, where an inmate is represented by 
counsel, that lawyer will be invited to attend the meeting and make a 
recommendation to the district attorney as to how the office should proceed.135 
Like Dallas County, Manhattan does not employ a concrete standard in 
determining guilt or innocence, as Vance explained: 
 
I do not pretend that we have devised a simple formula in this regard. I 
will say this: if in reviewing a case, we are looking at the same evidence 
the jury saw, and if the trial seems to us to have been conducted in a fair 
and competent manner, we would be strongly disinclined to vacate a jury 
verdict of guilty—even if we feel, in hindsight, that we might have 
reached a different verdict. But on the other hand, if we now have 
evidence the jury did not know, or if there was some procedural defect in 
the trial that prevented the jury from evaluating the evidence fairly, then 
we would be more inclined to substitute our view of the case for that of 
the trial jury. But in each instance, the question is the same, and remains 
central: do we believe, or at least strongly suspect, that the defendant is 
actually innocent?136 
 
In the year and a half since the program began, Manhattan has vacated one 
conviction (the case awaits retrial) and confirmed through investigation that two 
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134 Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
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other convictions were valid.137 Although Vance acknowledges that the program is 
still a work in progress, he also has described the results of his Conviction Integrity 
Program as “unequivocal”: “the system we have devised works.”138  
 
4.  Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office 
 
In 2011, the newly elected district attorney in Santa Clara County, California 
Jeffrey Rosen, established a Conviction Integrity Unit for his district.139 Like 
Dallas, Santa Clara had encountered its fair share of bad press in the lead up to 
creation of the unit, including a series of misconduct allegations against 
prosecutors in the office140 and the suspension of one such prosecutor by the 
California State Bar Association.141 Like Lykos and Watkins, Rosen ran on a 
                                                     
137 See id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Interview by David Onek with Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Cnty. Dist. 
Attorney, The Criminal Justice Conversations Podcast with David Onek, Episode #24 
(May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Rosen Interview], available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/fil 
es/CrimJusPod_Episode24v2.pdf. 
140 Sue Dremann, DA Officially Creates Conviction-Integrity Unit, PALO ALTO 
ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2011, 3:17 PM) http://paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=204 
27. The sanctioning of this Santa Clara prosecutor by the California State Bar is notable in 
part because of the extreme rarity of prosecutorial sanctioning. Between 1970 and 2009, 
only forty-four cases had been brought in which prosecutors faced disciplinary proceedings 
for misconduct relating to defendants’ constitutional rights. DAVIS, supra note 52, at 128–
29. This was even true in cases where appellate courts, in reversing a conviction due to 
Brady violations or prosecutors knowingly allowing lying witnesses to testify, described 
the prosecutors’ behavior as “unforgivable,” “intolerable,” “beyond reprehension,” and 
“illegal, improper and dishonest.” Id. at 135–36. Indeed, not only were these prosecutors 
not sanctioned by their respective bars, their offices largely chose not to discipline them 
either. Id. at 136–38; see also MEDWED, supra note 119, at 29–31 (arguing that current 
prosecutorial discipline is ineffective); Scheck, supra note 20, at 2222 (noting the lack of 
interoffice sanctions and arguing in favor of interoffice sanctions in light of the 
ineffectiveness of state bar and judicial remedies). 
141 In a rare instance of a state bar sanctioning an active prosecutor, in May 2012, the 
California State Bar charged Santa Clara Deputy District Attorney Troy Benson with five 
counts of misconduct, including suppressing evidence and then lying to conceal having 
done so. The charges stemmed from a 2006 child molestation case in which Benson 
allegedly failed to turn over a videotape that cast doubt on whether the victim was, in fact, 
abused, and then denied concealing the evidence, including while under oath in court. The 
defendant in the case served four years in prison before his conviction was overturned on 
the basis of Benson’s conduct (conduct expressly condemned by the appellate court). The 
discovery of the suppressed videotape led to the discovery of thousands of other such 
undisclosed tapes, forcing prosecutors and public defenders to reexamine hundreds of 
molestation cases. Tracey Kaplan, State Bar Charges Santa Clara County Prosecutor with 
Misconduct; Disbarment Possible, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 17, 2012, 11:43:01 
AM) http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_20646441/state-bar-charges-santa-clar 
a-county-prosecutor-misconduct. 
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platform of renewing ethical integrity, promising to raise the District Attorney’s 
Office’s ethical standards and to restore integrity and public trust in the office.142 
During his campaign, Rosen pledged to improve training for prosecutors and to 
review any cases alleging misconduct or miscarriages of justice.143 His victory 
over incumbent Dolores Carr was the first time in more than eighty years that an 
incumbent district attorney had failed to win reelection in Santa Clara County.144 
Rosen tapped David Angel, an experienced prosecutor known as a reformer in 
the office, to be his first Conviction Integrity Unit director.145 Along with Angel, 
the office assigned a special assistant district attorney and a full-time investigator 
to the unit. Not only had Angel reformed the county’s eyewitness protocol and 
pushed for the recording of suspect interviews in cases involving violent crime, but 
he also participated in an internal office investigation that resulted in the 
exoneration of a man wrongfully convicted and sentenced to life in prison.146 In 
addition to his years of experience as a prosecutor, Angel also teaches a seminar on 
righting wrongful convictions at Santa Clara Law School with Northern California 
Innocence Project Executive Director Cookie Ridolfi. Angel is also well regarded 
by both prosecutors and defense lawyers,147 a valuable asset given that, like 
Manhattan and Dallas, Santa Clara often collaborates with the Innocence Project 
on postconviction innocence cases.148  
Like Manhattan, Santa Clara’s program involves prominent front- and back-
end components. On the front end, the office strengthened its training for 
prosecutors and police officers on ethics, discovery obligations, and the warning 
signs of wrongful convictions, often drawing upon old cases of official misconduct 
and wrongful convictions from the office to instruct on how to avoid these 
problems.149 Rosen also changed the office’s policy on Brady disclosures. Under 
                                                     
142 See Rosen Interview, supra note 139. 
143 Mike Colgan, Santa Clara District Attorney Unveils ‘Integrity Unit,’ CBS SAN 
FRANCISCO (Mar. 18, 2011, 11:32 AM) http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/03/18/santa- 
clara-district-attorney-unveils-integrity-unit/. 
144 Id. 
145 Dremann, supra note 140.  
146 Id. Indeed, when an earlier Santa Clara district attorney, George Kennedy, decided 
to set up a task force to investigate and improve protocols relating to wrongful conviction 
in the early 2000s, he also chose David Angel to spearhead the project (the task force was 
later disbanded under Dolores Carr). See Telephone Interview with David Angel, 
Conviction Integrity Unit Director, Santa Clara Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (July 19, 
2012) [hereinafter Angel Interview]. 
147 See David Angel—Prosecutor Relights County’s Conviction Integrity Unit, 
VERITAS INITIATIVE (Mar. 28, 2011) http://www.veritasinitiative.org/news/david-angel-pro 
secutor-relights-countys-conviction-integrity-unit/. 
148 Mike Colgan, Santa Clara District Attorney Unveils ‘Integrity Unit’, CBS SAN 
FRANCISCO (Mar. 18, 2011) http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/03/18/santa-clara-distric 
t-attorney-unveils-integrity-unit/. 
149 Rosen Interview, supra note 139; see also Colgan, supra note 148 (noting Angel’s 
campaign promise to achieve the goals of improved training and addressing pass instances 
of misconduct). 
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California law, prosecutors must turn over the evidence at least thirty days before 
trial, but Rosen initiated a new policy under which his prosecutors would disclose 
information even earlier (“as soon as feasible”).150 To facilitate both pretrial 
discovery and posttrial review, Santa Clara also began streamlining its discovery 
process by relying more heavily on web-based software and digital evidence 
storage,151 and it invited public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys to 
provide input on other potential ways to improve discovery.152 Rosen also has 
taken a hard line among his assistants on complying with discovery obligations: in 
2011, the press covered a story in which Rosen pulled a prosecutor off a high-
profile gang case because the prosecutor failed to provide timely discovery.153 
Santa Clara’s Conviction Integrity Unit focuses its efforts on postconviction 
claims of actual innocence,154 but under some circumstances it will even review 
alleged sentencing injustices.155 While Santa Clara does not limit the claims it 
reviews to the legal requirements of the California innocence law,156 it does 
generally require either a showing of some new evidence that was not presented to 
the jury or a very credible allegation of some sort of official misconduct.157 Of 
course, where credible, respected defense attorneys have raised concerns about the 
conviction of their clients, the office has investigated those cases as well.158 
Indeed, Santa Clara has participated in two exonerations in cases in which there 
was no new evidence or allegations of misconduct but where a seasoned defense 
attorney expressed deep concerns that a wrongful conviction had occurred.159 
Rosen changed office policy on DNA testing and postconviction discovery as 
well. While California’s DNA testing statute is fairly defendant friendly,160 Santa 
Clara adopted an even less demanding standard for DNA requests, permitting 
                                                     
150 Rosen Interview, supra note 139. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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154 Santa Clara does limit itself to postconviction claims of actual innocence. If the 
claim is raised in an open case, the unit refers the claim back to the trial deputy and 
instructs the defendant to bring it to the attention of the relevant division director if 
appropriate. See Angel Interview, supra note 146. Angel indicated that failing to honor this 
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155 See Rosen Interview, supra note 139 (indicating Santa Clara’s willingness to 
review certain incarceration cases under California’s Three Strikes policy where the third 
strike was a nonviolent offense). 
156 See, e.g., In re Bell, 170 P.3d 153, 157 (Cal. 2007) (recognizing a claim of actual 
innocence under California law).  
157 See Angel Interview, supra note 146. 
158 Id. 
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160 See id. (referring to California’s DNA testing law as robust); see also OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, LETTER FROM CAL. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BILL LOCKYER 2–3 (2001), available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/publications/fin 
alproof.pdf (outlining parameters of the DNA testing statute). 
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testing upon any request, so long as the inmate is willing to pay for it.161 The office 
also has an open-file policy, which Angel has said actually serves as a good first 
filter for the postconviction review process, allowing the prosecutor to confirm that 
the file is complete and that all appropriate information was turned over initially.162 
And, of course, the office’s new digitalization of its case file system makes its 
open-file policy less costly and time consuming than it would be otherwise, and it 
generally ensures a more complete file.163 
Like Manhattan, Santa Clara has taken a middle-of-the-road position with 
regard to the original prosecutor’s involvement in the postconviction review 
process. As Angel explained, it is essential that the trial attorney not be in charge 
of the review in order to preserve the independence of the evaluation (a policy 
which, he notes, benefits the original prosecutor—ensuring credibility for the 
finding that no prosecutorial error occurred).164 On the other hand, if the reviewing 
attorney does not consult with the original prosecutor at all, the Conviction 
Integrity Unit may appear to be searching for prosecutorial error and come to be 
viewed by line attorneys as a watchdog, rather than as a prosecutorial failsafe.165 
For those reasons, when Angel or one of his assistant district attorneys conducts 
the initial review, pulls the file, and decides further investigation is warranted, the 
original prosecutor receives a courtesy call or e-mail explaining that a review is 
underway and soliciting any information the original prosecutor might consider 
helpful.166 Most often, the original prosecutor does not have information to share, 
but in a minority of cases, the prosecutor does weigh in, and her views, dismissive 
or affirming, are taken into consideration.167 
Santa Clara has structured the unit to maximize its independence and 
objectivity. Angel is part of the office’s executive management and reports directly 
to Rosen.168 He participates in the weekly executive meetings in which the most 
pressing current issues and office priorities are discussed and through which the 
moral tone of the office is set.169 As Angel explained, having the Conviction 
Integrity Unit as a central part of the process is crucial to its success and credibility 
within the office so that it is not viewed as an adversarial side entity, but instead as 
central to the mission of the office.170 The centrality of Santa Clara’s Conviction 
Integrity Unit is also ensured by the office hierarchy: Angel oversees the office’s 
appellate division, its crime lab, and its training program.171 By virtue of his 
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oversight over these divisions, Angel is able to ensure that avoiding and remedying 
wrongful convictions is a central part of Santa Clara’s core mission. Indeed, 
Angel’s authority over the appellate unit is important to setting the appropriate 
standard for prosecutorial conduct. When appellate prosecutors are narrowly 
focused on maintaining convictions, they may defend on appeal questionable 
ethical behavior on behalf of the original prosecutor simply because a 
constitutional justification for doing so exists.172 This is true even where justice 
may be better served by repudiating such behavior and even allowing the 
conviction to be reversed.173 The Conviction Integrity Unit has the authority, 
however, to change the way these cases are argued and to send the message to 
prosecutors, courts, and the public that, as Angel explained, “the standard in our 
office is not the constitutional minimum.”174  
 
5.  Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office 
 
In February 2012, Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez announced 
her office’s creation of a Conviction Integrity Unit175 and that the office already 
was looking into thirty-five cases in which defendants claimed innocence.176 Both 
during and before Alvarez’s tenure, Cook County has had a long-term problem 
with wrongful conviction. Alvarez has come under heavy criticism from the 
Innocence Project for her handling of the wrongful convictions of young black 
men, specifically the cases of the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four, cases which 
involved exonerating DNA.177 Although Alvarez has come under fire herself in 
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material is provided to defendants. See id. The office has taken the view that complete 
transparency regarding forensic analysts and analysis is the prosecutorial obligation; as a 
result, Santa Clara produces to defendants information regarding any corrective action 
taken against an analyst, the results of the relevant analyst’s proficiency tests, and anything 
else arguably negative that is not directly related to a purely personnel matter. See id. 
172 See id.  
173 See id. 
174 Id. 
175 Rob Wildeboer, Alvarez: New Unit Will Prevent Wrongful Conviction, WBEZ 
91.5 (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.wbez.org/story/alvarez-new-unit-will-prevent-wrongful-co 
nvictions-96082. The office had been established the previous month. See Telephone 
Interview with Fabio Valentini, Chief of Criminal Bureau, Cook Cnty. State’s Attorney’s 
Office (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter Valentini Interview]. 
176 Innocence Project Isn’t Satisfied With the Creation of Illinois Unit to Study 
Wrongful Convictions, N. STAR NEWS & ANALYSIS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.thenorthstar 
news.com/issue/id/february-9-2012. 
177 Id. The Dixmoor Five, all then teenagers, confessed to the 1991 murder of a 
fourteen-year-old girl and were convicted, even though law enforcement officials had DNA 
evidence that indicated none of them participated in the crime. Id. Similarly, the 
Englewood Four involved four black male teenagers who were coerced by police into 
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recent years,178 Cook County’s wrongful conviction problem predates her time in 
office. According to the National Registry of Exonerations, a joint project by the 
University of Michigan and Northwestern University law schools, Illinois—and 
Cook County specifically—leads the country in wrongful convictions since 
1989.179  
Cook County’s Conviction Integrity Unit has four attorneys dedicated to 
reviewing postconviction claims on a full-time basis: the deputy supervisor in the 
Special Litigation Unit and three other experienced attorneys.180 In addition, the 
unit has two full-time investigators and a victim and witness specialist.181 The unit 
is under the umbrella of Cook County’s Criminal Bureau and its Special Litigation 
Division, along with Cook County’s Post-Conviction Unit, which reviews and 
responds to habeas cases. Like Dallas and Manhattan, Cook County does not 
restrict its review to claims cognizable in court—it will review a claim of actual 
innocence whether or not it complies with statutory or precedential requirements 
for an innocence claim.182 Indeed, Cook County may proceed with postconviction 
review even while a judge is still deciding whether an inmate’s actual innocence 
claim should move forward.183 Unlike Dallas, Cook County did not obtain 
additional funding or grant money to set up its Conviction Integrity Unit, choosing 
instead to divert resources from other office programs in favor of its postconviction 
review program.184 
In the wake of announcing the unit’s creation, Cook County received a tidal 
wave of claims of actual innocence, which only began slowing months later.185 At 
present, it is prioritizing the most serious claims of actual innocence, like murders 
                                                     
confessing to the 1994 rape and murder of a prostitute, also despite police and prosecutorial 
access to exonerating DNA. Id. 
178 See id. (“Lawyers have rained withering criticism on Alvarez over her handling of 
the wrongful convictions of young black men, especially when DNA evidence had shown 
someone else committed the crimes for which the men spent decades in prison.”). 
179 Cook County Leads Nation in Wrongful Convictions, CBS CHICAGO (June 12, 
2012, 10:18 AM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/06/12/cook-county-leads-nation-in-wr 
ongful-convictions/. 
180 Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
181 Rummana Hussein, Proescutor Alvarez Creates Team to Probe Wrongful 
Conviction Claims, CHI. SUN TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.suntimes.com/ne 
ws/politics/10396284-418/prosecutor-alvarez-creates-team-to-probe-wrongful-conviction-c 
laims.html. 
182 Valentini Interview, supra note 175. Illinois has enacted a postconviction relief 
statute that specifically provides for an actual innocence claim if the petitioner can show 
material new evidence that is not cumulative of evidence available to it at trial. See People 
v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 948–952 (Ill. 2009). In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
held the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution affords postconviction petitioners 
the right to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence. Id. 
183 Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
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and rapes, and cases where individuals are still incarcerated.186 Cases bearing the 
standard indicia of a wrongful conviction case (cases involving only one 
eyewitness, a confession with little supporting evidence, or a confession case 
involving a juvenile or low IQ individual) receive special attention.187 While a 
guilty plea is not a bar to review, it is a factor the unit considers when weighing the 
merits of the claim and determining where it falls in terms of priority of review.188 
The office does not have a formal open-file discovery policy or a blanket policy of 
consenting to DNA cases, but, according to the office, it does, for the most part, 
comply with discovery requests and only rarely objects to requests for DNA 
testing.189  
Decisions regarding whether innocence claims should be investigated are 
made using the experienced judgment of the prosecutors responsible for the unit—
both the Criminal Bureau chief and the supervisor of the Conviction Integrity 
Unit.190 In the vast majority of cases, the initial reviewer pulls the case file and 
relevant transcripts in order to assess the credibility of the actual innocence claim, 
with the exception to this practice occurring where the initial letter contains so 
much information that reviewing the file is unnecessary.191 If further investigation 
is needed, the unit supervisor most often assigns the case to one of the unit’s 
assistant district attorneys but occasionally handles the investigation herself.192 
Reinvestigations are conducted much like initial investigations, though with the 
passage of ten, twenty, or thirty years, the investigation is far more difficult. The 
reviewing prosecutor looks for the same things she would have in a preconviction 
review of the case: consistency or inconsistency in witness accounts, whether the 
offender’s account is credible and genuine, and whether there is physical evidence 
(DNA or otherwise) that was not tested contemporaneously but that might have 
become testable since or requires retesting.193 Just as with the initial charging 
decision, the prosecutor is instructed to review the case with no presumption of the 
suspect’s guilt, but she does weigh to some degree the fact that the individual has 
been convicted by a jury, has had a trial judge likely reject a motion for new trial, 
and generally has had the verdict upheld on appeal and in the postconviction 
context.194  
The office has no standard or scientific formula for determining when and 
whether an inmate has demonstrated her innocence.195 Rather, the unit relies on the 
                                                     
186 See id. 
187 Wildeboer, supra note 175; see also Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
188 See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
189 See id. In Harris County, for instance, prosecutors deny requests for DNA testing 
where the DNA testing requested would not provide definitive proof of guilt or innocence 
in any event. See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
190 See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
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expertise of the prosecutors reviewing the case as individuals who have tried a 
large number of cases and developed instincts through their experience as to what 
evidence is good or bad.196 Where the unit determines that there was not sufficient 
evidence to prosecute an inmate, the office may nolle pros the case or not oppose a 
postconviction claim of innocence.197 Where there are lingering questions 
internally about whether the person is actually guilty, regardless of whether the 
case is in a preconviction stage or a postconviction stage, Cook County’s policy is 
to dismiss the case and not prosecute it again.198  
 
B.  What These Units Indicate and What They Are Missing 
 
The conviction integrity units in all five of these jurisdictions represent a 
significant and impressive investment of time, energy, funds, and experience by 
very busy prosecutors with finite resources. Through this dedication of intellectual 
and financial resources, and now through the years of experience these offices 
have gained through conducting postconviction review, several overarching, 
essential components of postconviction review are apparent, including the 
importance of encouraging innocence seeking, openness, and objectivity. Each of 
the conviction integrity units reviewed above, and particularly Dallas and Santa 
Clara, have structured their units in an attempt to make conviction integrity, or 
innocence seeking, part of the office culture. For example, in Santa Clara County, 
the conviction integrity unit director also oversees the office’s appellate division, 
and by refusing to defend constitutionally questionable changes on the appellate 
side, he has changed the office’s preconviction practices, requiring the office to 
operate well above the constitutionally required standards of conduct.199 All 
conviction integrity units but Harris County and Cook County have embraced 
open-file discovery and open-DNA-testing policies, and all carefully circumscribe 
the role of the original prosecutor in reviewing innocence claims. The efforts of 
these conviction integrity units demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of 
these policies, and all of these policies taken together form a postconviction review 
structure that is capable of widespread implementation by prosecutors’ offices 
across the country. 
While Dallas County was able to secure additional funding specifically aimed 
at implementing a conviction integrity unit, the majority of these units represent a 
significant expenditure and a shifting of resources away from other office 
priorities. But postconviction review need not be this expensive. As detailed below 
in Part III, postconviction review does not require a freestanding conviction 
integrity unit: applying the three essential principles above can assist any office in 
improving its ability to identify the wrongfully convicted, whether the office has 
prosecutors dedicated full time to this kind of review or not.  
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III.  RESOLVING THE PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA: STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS 
AND TIERED REVIEW 
 
The efforts of the five studied district attorneys’ offices provide important 
insights for effective postconviction review, but even among these highly effective 
units, there is room for improvement. Part III proposes to resolve remaining 
structural weaknesses in a way that will be tractable in other district attorneys’ 
offices. Part III.A draws together the most useful aspects of these units and uses 
them to outline three broadly applicable structural modifications for prosecutorial 
postconviction review: (1) a management-level prosecutor must direct the review 
of innocence claims; (2) the review must be performed by someone other than the 
original prosecutor; and (3) the office must, with specific exceptions outlined 
below, cooperate with inmates by opening case files and approving requests for 
DNA testing.  
Part III.B then supplies what the established structure of each conviction 
integrity unit lacks: legal and ethical principles that can guide that postconviction 
review process. As explained in the introduction, “tiered review” functions guide 
the posture that prosecutors adopt in the face of claims of actual innocence. The 
concept of tiered review encompasses three components: (1) a prosecutorial 
investigation where a bona fide issue exists as to the petitioner’s innocence, (2) 
dropping of prosecutorial opposition to an innocence claim where the investigation 
demonstrates a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” and (3) affirmative support 
for exoneration in the event that the investigation yields “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the petitioner was wrongfully convicted.  
Taken together, these two pieces represent a complete review framework: 
first, a postconviction review structure designed to efficiently manage inherent 
prosecutorial biases, and second, a postconviction review process that operates 
within that structure using clear standards of review on which prosecutors can rely 
to determine what action is appropriate and when with regard to an innocence 
claim. Although in a resource-abundant world, prosecutors’ offices across the 
country could each have a “Conviction Integrity Unit” devoted exclusively to 
postconviction review of innocence claims, in the vast majority of prosecutors’ 
offices, the resources to dedicate prosecutors full time to that effort are simply 
missing.200 While the framework set forth below is based on lessons learned from 
conviction integrity units, it could just as easily be used by an appellate division, 
postconviction writ division, or individual prosecutors who encounter claims of 
actual innocence.  
The most important characteristic of this type of postconviction review is the 
standardization itself—that a fairly detailed protocol, with a clearly assigned 
                                                     
200 Indeed, for offices in less populous cities that receive far fewer innocence claims, 
it would be a waste of money and effort to do so. Of the approximately 2,500 district 
attorney offices across the United States, 85% are operated by four lawyers or fewer. See 
Telephone Interview with Scott Burns, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n (July 2, 
2012) [hereinafter Burns Interview]. 
2014] THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA 647 
standard of review and policy of maintaining an eye for innocence, is adopted by 
an office in its entirety and employed by all prosecutors engaged in reviewing 
innocence claims. While the specific standards of proof required in the procedural 
component outlined in Part III.B are certain to be interpreted differently depending 
upon the prosecutor applying the standard,201 the very process of applying an 
objective standard—of stepping away from “gut instinct” and attempting to look 
dispassionately at the evidence to determine whether it reaches the appropriate 
threshold—forces prosecutors to at least try to excise their biases and train a sharp 
eye on the merits of the case before them. This effort—and the support that a clear 
office policy of objective review provides for engaging in such an effort—helps to 
align prosecutorial postconviction action with the minister of justice role 
prosecutors seek to observe.  
 
A.  Essential Components of a Framework for Responding to Actual Innocence 
Claims 
 
The fundamental principles of a postconviction review regime, detailed 
below, are principles that apply as well to a six-prosecutor conviction integrity 
review team as to a two-prosecutor district attorney’s office. These basic principles 
include (1) fostering an office culture of seeking innocence by integrating the 
postconviction review process into the office structure, (2) establishing a policy of 
openness by freely authorizing DNA testing and providing open-file discovery, 
and (3) encouraging objectivity by creating an office authority position with direct 
access to the district attorney responsible for innocence claim review. 
 
1.  Fostering an Office Culture of Seeking Innocence 
 
A crucial component for ensuring objective review of postconviction claims is 
to develop an office policy of seeking innocence by making the awareness of 
wrongful conviction an integral part of office culture. By instituting a standardized 
office-wide postconviction review policy, the district attorney sends the message 
that prosecutors should seek out wrongful convictions. When prosecutors are 
actively involved in the exoneration process pursuant to office policy, it opens up 
the possibility for an exoneration to be perceived as an office victory rather than a 
public embarrassment. Having the goal of finding the wrongful conviction before it 
finds the office incentivizes prosecutors to give claims of innocence an objective 
review, harnessing the prosecutor’s naturally competitive spirit in pursuit of 
postconviction justice. Moreover, where the district attorney institutes a policy that 
acknowledges the reality of wrongful convictions and educates prosecutors on their 
common causes, she removes some of the stigma associated with having obtained 
a wrongful conviction, which improves office morale, encourages objective 
review, and improves the likelihood that prosecutors with postconviction review 
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responsibilities will not be viewed with suspicion or hostility by others within the 
office.202 
District attorneys signal to the office and the public their commitment to 
innocence through whom they choose to lead their conviction integrity efforts and 
by how they integrate a postconviction review process into the office’s existent 
operations. In Dallas County, the past two heads of the conviction integrity unit 
have been criminal defense lawyers.203 To ensure that this individual was not 
marginalized and would have the necessary authority to implement desired 
reforms, Watkins made him third in command in the office and supervisor over the 
office’s existent postconviction units (e.g., the divisions handling appeals and 
postconviction writs).204 In Santa Clara County, David Angel, a highly respected 
and long-time prosecutor, was chosen to lead the unit, operate as the office’s third 
in command, and oversee appeals, postconviction writs, and all training for the 
office.205 Angel uses the appeals process to set the tone for post- and preconviction 
prosecutorial efforts. By refusing to defend questionable prosecutorial ethical 
conduct on appeal, Angel requires above-the-constitutional-minimum ethical 
conduct from the office’s prosecutors prior to conviction, thereby increasing the 
robustness of day-to-day ethics in the office. Doing so also saves costs: ensuring 
the office operates well above the constitutional minimum on the front end reduces 
the amount of litigation the office faces on the back end in habeas and appeals, and 
it makes future claims far easier to defend.206 Entwining postconviction review 
efforts with appellate strategy also ensures a uniform office-wide position on 
issues of prosecutorial ethics—without it, individual appellate attorneys end up 
responding to arguments and resolving immediate problems on a case-by-case 
basis, without any connection to an overall office policy to ensure that the mistake 
is not repeated in the future.207 
 
2.  Establishing a Policy of Openness and Disclosure 
 
In virtually all of the offices with conviction integrity units, a key part of 
sending a message of innocence seeking to prosecutors and the public has been to 
adopt a generous policy of DNA testing and file sharing, notwithstanding the lack 
                                                     
202 Where an office establishes as the baseline that wrongful convictions do occur and 
that avoiding prosecution of the innocent is a priority, prosecutors essentially will have to 
“opt out” of the office default in order to continue adversarial, reflexive responses to 
innocence petitions, and, therefore, fewer mistakes will be made in both the pre- and 
postconviction contexts. Cf. Neil Savage, Redesigning Banking with Behavioral Economics 
in Mind, MIT TECH. REV., Apr. 2011, at 18, 18–19 (citing behavioral economics for the 
proposition that where one sets the baseline for conduct matters (e.g., it is easier to 
convince someone to try something if they have to opt out rather than opt in)).  
203 Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
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of a postconviction discovery obligation.208 As each of the offices acknowledged, 
there are significant trade-offs—namely, cost—to an open-DNA-testing policy and 
an open-file policy. Given the volume of frivolous claims that prosecutors receive, 
the costs of open DNA testing and particularly of file sharing are not insignificant. 
Nevertheless, a policy of transparency is not only important for detecting the 
wrongfully convicted,209 but also for the message transparency sends to the public 
and to prosecutors. 
While an open-file policy is a closer case, the benefits of an open-DNA-
testing policy exceed the costs, for several reasons. First, the costs of an open-
testing policy can, to some extent, be cabined. For instance, most offices require 
the requester to make a showing that the results of the testing sought be actually 
conclusive as to guilt or innocence prior to footing the bill for the testing.210 
Prosecutors also can implement policies that discourage frivolous testing requests: 
in Dallas County, when an inmate requests DNA testing that ultimately confirms 
his or her guilt, the district attorney’s office shares information regarding the 
request and confirmatory result with the parole board, and that information may 
delay access to parole.211 Second, the costs of DNA testing are relatively low—
especially when compared with the costs of litigating a request under the relevant 
state DNA testing statute.212 According to the Santa Clara County’s district 
attorney’s office, the costs of allowing DNA testing are actually lower than the 
costs of contesting the requests.213 Third, the consequences of contesting an 
exonerating DNA test are extremely high. A hotly contested DNA exoneration has, 
in the past, meant the end of a district attorney’s tenure.214 It can unnecessarily 
extend the imprisonment of an innocent individual, and it can delay arrest of the 
real perpetrator—which may allow the statute of limitations to run on charging the 
actual perpetrator, not to mention leave the real perpetrator free to commit 
additional crimes.215 Fourth, allowing DNA testing communicates to prosecutors, 
                                                     
208 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
209 See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 270 (“A 
transparent criminal justice system, one which provides full disclosure of information to 
the opposing parties in as timely a manner as possible, should help to reduce the number of 
miscarriages of justice.”). 
210 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. If a 
murder took place in an alley littered with cigarette butts, prosecutors likely would not be 
inclined to pay for testing for each cigarette butt in the hopes that doing so may provide a 
lead for an already convicted individual. In other instances, Santa Clara County, for 
instance, grants requesters access to any DNA testing they choose, provided that they are 
willing to pay for it. Angel Interview, supra note 146. If the requester can meet the 
statutory requirement, of course, he or she can have the state cover the costs. See id. 
211 Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
212 See Angel Interview, supra note 146. 
213 See id. 
214 See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
215 Jason Kreag, an attorney with the Innocence Project, framed the issue in a request 
to Clark County District Attorney Steven Wolfson:  
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prisoners, defense counsel, and the public that the office is confident in its results 
but also open to the possibility of innocence—a move that increases public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Given the relatively low costs of testing, 
high costs of litigation, extremely high costs of contesting a valid request for 
testing, and benefits to a policy of openness, permitting access to DNA testing 
seems to be the clear answer. 
Open-file discovery is another important component of a postconviction 
review framework, though implementing an open-file policy presents a much 
closer case than does DNA testing: the costs are higher and the benefits not as 
obvious. No jurisdiction grants a petitioner postconviction discovery as of right,216 
but despite that fact, the majority of the conviction integrity programs discussed 
above have an open-file policy. The policy implemented, in each case, is not 
without limits—privileged and confidential information is not disclosed by any 
office, and the requester typically is required to make some proffer of why the 
requested evidence is relevant to her claim of innocence to obtain her file.217 
Offices also cabin costs by requiring requesters or a representative of the requester 
to come to an onsite location to view the documents or evidence, rather than 
tasking someone within the office with the time-consuming job of photocopying 
files.218 As files become increasingly digitalized, the costs continue to decrease,219 
and because offices are increasingly adopting policies requiring prosecutors to 
include every document and piece of evidence related to the case in the file, the 
contents of the file will become increasingly accurate as well.220 Finally, as the 
Criminal Bureau chief from Cook County noted, because in most offices the 
innocence claim reviewer is required to pull and review the file whenever a claim 
of actual innocence is received, the added costs of making the file available to the 
petitioner are not that high.221 Indeed, searching for confidential, privileged, or 
relevant materials may actually be a helpful exercise, forcing the reviewer to look 
                                                     
My question is simple: what do you have to lose by consenting to testing? If the 
results confirm Ms. Labato’s involvement in the murder, then that would 
effectively end the case, and Ms. Labato’s conviction would stand. . . . But if the 
testing identified someone other than Ms. Labato as the murderer, then that 
result could not only serve as compelling evidence of Ms. Labato’s innocence 
but also bring the true perpetrator to justice. 
 
Mark Godsey, Tuesday’s Quick Clicks, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 26, 2012), 
(emphasis omitted) http://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2012/06/26/tuesdays-quick-clicks1 
7/. 
216 See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; 
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217 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
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220 See, e.g., id. (requiring written permission from office leadership to withhold any 
information from case files). 
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closely at the file contents when making a determination regarding whether further 
investigation is needed. 
Unfortunately, the costs of an open-file policy include more than simply 
copying or making a file available. However cabined the policy may be, an open-
file policy requires already overwhelmed prosecutors to spend valuable time 
reviewing case files for privileged and confidential information. In large offices 
that handle a significant volume of cases, it may be costly and time intensive to 
pull files from off-site locations and to discover the relevant set of files when the 
trial prosecutor is no longer with the office. And, of course, more often than not, 
this significant time and energy will be expended for a claim that is entirely 
without merit.  
More significantly, postconviction file sharing is virtually certain to increase 
litigation costs. If inmates already are inclined to frivolous claims of actual 
innocence, providing inmates with case file information is likely to increase the 
number of claims filed and provide fodder to use in giving claims facial validity. 
Allegations of Brady violations are also likely to increase where a file contains 
information that an inmate may not have seen before. Moreover, for the many 
offices that do diligently provide trial discovery and Brady disclosures to opposing 
counsel, they are providing inmates with information they already should have 
received, via their defense counsel, prior to trial. Because an open-file policy is 
certain to increase inmate litigation, to some extent an open-file policy results in 
prosecutors subsidizing future frivolous claims with their time and resources. 
On the other hand, allowing external review of office files—by inmates or 
their lawyers—serves as a valuable backstop to prosecutors’ efforts to ensure a 
diligent and objective review of a case file. First, for the typical indigent, convicted 
innocent—someone without resources to hire a lawyer or investigator and with no 
right to a court-appointed lawyer—the odds of uncovering exculpatory evidence 
without prosecutorial assistance are remarkably low.222 Even for those who were 
adequately represented by counsel in the first instance, postconviction review may 
be the first opportunity the convicted has to see the inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence assembled by the prosecutor. The inmate’s personal knowledge of the 
witnesses involved, the timing of events, and her own alibi may give her an edge 
over a prosecutor in terms of identifying relevant exonerating evidence. Moreover, 
that inmate and her counsel almost certainly have more time than a prosecutor to 
spend reviewing the file. And, of course, innocence projects may also have more 
resources to devote to case review, if only they could receive access to 
prosecutors’ files. Some innocence projects spend eight months reviewing a case 
file—far more time than a prosecutor is able to spend—and review it with an eye 
well trained to search for relevant indicators of innocence and consider alternate 
forensic testing methods.223 Although the costs of allowing open-file access are 
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exonerated after seventeen years in prison after new evidence was discovered in his case by 
Emory Law students who were interning with the Georgia Innocence Project. The county 
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certainly high, for prosecutors interested in avoiding injustice and establishing an 
office policy that prioritizes innocence seeking, opening their files to inmates in 
search of exoneration—even the guilty ones—should be an office priority. Offices 
with an open-file policy view it as essential to ensuring that the public not view 
prosecutors as trying to conceal bad facts. As the head of the Dallas County 
Conviction Integrity Unit, Russell Wilson, explained, referencing the prosecutor’s 
duty to ensure justice, “Let’s get to the merits—either it’s a good case or not.”224  
By sharing case files and allowing DNA testing, the prosecutor moves away 
from the adversarial role that often inheres in prosecution by the nature of the 
investigation, indictment, and trial process, and moves closer to the minister of 
justice ideal. Creating an office policy of openness to some extent forces 
prosecutors to put aside the “defend the conviction” mentality and accept the 
consequences of an outside evaluation of the case on the merits. That this is true 
for all cases, not just for those cases where inmates have made some sort of 
showing of merit or prosecutorial misconduct, also establishes an ethos in the 
office that openness and disclosure is simply office policy—not an attempt by a 
postconviction inspector general to delve through the files of hardworking 
prosecutors trying to do their jobs. Indeed, a policy of openness with regard to 
DNA testing and file sharing promotes a mentality within the office more akin to 
the “neutral administrative agency” role advocated by Professors Green and 
Yaroshefsky.225 This type of office culture makes finding the innocent needle in 
the haystack far more likely than it would be otherwise. While a policy of 
transparency is not without significant cost, for those prosecutors truly concerned 
about righting the wrongs of wrongful conviction, the benefits outweigh the costs. 
 
3.  Facilitating Objective Review and Neutralizing Prosecutorial Biases 
 
Perhaps most importantly, to recognize a wrongful conviction, prosecutors 
need objectivity, a legitimate challenge in an environment where conviction 
statistics often are the measure of a good prosecutor.226 That challenge is 
                                                     
district attorney’s office had told Clarence Harrison that all of the evidence in his case had 
been destroyed, but the interns discovered a slide of the rapist’s semen from the victim’s 
rape kit in Harrison’s files, a slide that ultimately exonerated him of the crime. Guilty Until 
Proven Innocent, EMORY MAG. (2005), http://www.emory.edu/EMORY_MAGAZINE/spri 
ng_2005/innocence2.html. 
224 Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
225 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 506 (citing Gerard E. Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124 (1998)). 
226 Id. at 511 (“Whoever engages in [postconviction review] should not reflexively 
seek to uphold the prior conviction, but should at least be neutral and open-minded if not, 
as in the Dallas office, skeptical regarding the legitimacy of the conviction.”). As Richard 
Rosen has noted, while there must be a presumption of guilt after conviction in order for 
the U.S. criminal justice system to operate, that rebuttable presumption unnecessarily and 
unfairly burdens the convicted innocent: “Because it is now clear that wrongful convictions 
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compounded by the fact that the number of valid innocence claims is so low when 
compared with the number of baseless innocence claims prosecutors must review. 
A member of the Harris County postconviction review team explained, “Our job 
entails probably 90 percent failure.”227 Nevertheless, the conviction integrity units 
studied all structured the review process to maximize the objectivity and neutrality 
of the reviewer, first and foremost by ensuring postconviction review was directed 
by an office authority, not by the original prosecutor in the case. 
The conviction integrity unit prosecutors interviewed were unanimous in 
noting the importance of ensuring that postconviction review was directed by an 
office authority.228 While data on postconviction review processes (and any 
internal district attorney offices’ processes) are notoriously difficult to obtain, the 
general wisdom is that in many, and possibly the majority, of prosecutors’ offices 
across the country, postconviction claims of innocence are automatically assigned 
to the original prosecutor.229 Even in those offices where appellate divisions handle 
postconviction matters, the original prosecutor is frequently consulted,230 as that 
individual is considered the office authority on the case. It is possible the 
prosecutor has information regarding the case that is not included within the case 
file. Accordingly, many offices view that prosecutor as best positioned to defend 
the conviction, in terms of experience, personal knowledge, and office efficiency. 
While this assignment system makes sense as a matter of prosecutorial efficiency, 
and if the goal is defending the conviction alone, it is counterproductive to 
determining the validity of the innocence claim. As various scholars have 
observed, prosecutors have strong institutional, professional, and cognitive 
incentives that tend toward resisting claims of innocence, particularly when the 
conviction was one an individual personally obtained.231 For that reason, involving 
                                                     
occur, thought should be given to changing those aspects of the system that unfairly burden 
innocent people who find themselves among the convicted.” Rosen, supra note 209, at 281. 
227 Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. One can query whether not finding more 
innocent petitioners is truly a “failure,” since often these investigations—and particularly 
DNA testing—confirm the guilt of the person already in prison, bolstering the credibility of 
the criminal justice system. 
228 See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; 
Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111; Valentini Interview, supra note 175; Wilson 
Interview, supra note 59.  
229 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 509 n.250; Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–
44. 
230 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 509 n.249; Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–
44.  
231 Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–48. Gauging prosecutorial success usually breaks 
down along the prosecutor’s “win” (conviction) and “loss” record, and this data is often 
used in promotion decisions. Medwed, supra note 18, at 44. Moreover, prosecutors 
generally bring charges against defendants whom they think are guilty, and the affirmation 
of a jury verdict frequently can boost a lawyer’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt—a 
confidence that may be difficult to shake by a convict’s assertion of innocence (which often 
requires additional investigation to confirm). Id. at 45; Medwed, supra note 8, at 142–43. 
In addition, questioning a conviction may cause tension with police investigators with 
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the original prosecutor in the postconviction review process often can make 
objective review of that claim more challenging than it would be otherwise.232 
The most effective postconviction review systems isolate the original 
prosecutor from the investigation until a preliminary opinion has been formed by 
the reviewing attorney. In Harris County, prosecutors conduct a full investigation 
and reach a preliminary conclusion before contacting the original prosecutor to 
solicit his or her views on guilt or innocence.233 While postconviction review 
prosecutors have reached a preliminary opinion at that time, the conversation with 
the original prosecutor is far from pro forma.234 The prosecuting attorney’s 
personal experience with the case and its accompanying investigation may yield 
some information or insight that postconviction review prosecutors have missed.235 
Moreover, if the original prosecutor is convinced of the inmate’s guilt and the 
reviewer is convinced of the inmate’s innocence, engaging in a dialogue with that 
prosecutor may be useful in understanding what went wrong in the original case, 
helping the original prosecutor understand what subsequent evidence has indicated, 
preparing the strongest possible argument in favor of innocence, and preparing for 
a pitch to the district attorney or the office’s executive management committee. 
While the original prosecutor may have valuable insight to add (though often 
prosecutors will not even remember the prosecution),236 a fresh set of eyes is key 
to unbiased review. Not only does the original prosecutor have a vested interest in 
maintaining the conviction, but her view on the guilt or innocence of the inmate is 
irrelevant in the postconviction context—the odds are high that the original 
prosecutor thought the defendant was guilty, or otherwise she would not have 
brought the case237—and that view almost certainly would have been validated by 
                                                     
whom a prosecutor works, where that investigator is convinced of the defendant’s guilt, 
and particularly where a confession or evidence may have been achieved by investigative 
overreaching. Medwed, supra note 8, at 144–45; Medwed, supra note 18, at 45–46. 
Prosecutorial bias also is impacted by macrolevel incentives: prosecutors’ offices often 
gauge their own success by their office’s overall conviction record, and politicians and the 
electorate consider these factors in assessing prosecutorial effectiveness. Medwed, supra 
note 18, at 45. This results in pressure on line attorneys to uphold their convictions and on 
chief prosecutors to ensure the same. Id.; see also MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25 
(discussing various cognitive biases that naturally occur in police investigation and 
criminal prosecution, including “confirmation bias” or “expectancy bias” and “belief 
perseverance,” that tend to contribute to tunnel vision on the part of police and 
prosecutors).  
232 Medwed, supra note 8, at 142–48. 
233 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
234 See id. 
235 See id.  
236 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
237 Prosecutors may not bring charges without “probable cause.” Green & 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 497; see also United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315 
(11th Cir. 2006). This standard is incorporated in state ethics rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013). Some prosecutor’s offices have set a higher standard 
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the jury’s verdict in the case. Fresh review by a prosecutor not involved in the 
original conviction, who is looking at the evidence for the first time and evaluating 
motives, alibis, and witness credibility without the pressure of public impatience 
for an arrest, a police investigator’s belief in the individual’s guilt, the ticking 
clock of the Speedy Trial Act,238 or a looming trial date, may go a long way toward 
ensuring objective review of a past conviction.239 
Of course, even where the original prosecutor is not involved in reviewing a 
postconviction claim of innocence, collegial relationships can often be an obstacle 
to unbiased review. When prosecutors are called upon to review the work of their 
peers or former peers, personal relationships may color their interpretation of the 
case or the prosecutorial conduct involved in the case.240 A prosecutor who 
discovers intentional misconduct or potentially sanctionable conduct when 
reviewing an innocence claim may be reticent to report it because of the fear of 
negative implications (sanctions or damage to professional reputation) for a 
colleague; negative reaction from other prosecutors or police investigators for 
having second-guessed the decision or reported the misconduct of a colleague;241 
and professional consequences for one’s self, should discovery of a wrongful 
conviction damage office statistics or hurt the reelection chances of the district 
attorney.242 
The challenges inherent in reviewing a peer’s conviction underscore the 
importance of having an office authority engage in the initial review or at least 
closely oversee the postconviction review process. In Dallas, Harris, Santa Clara, 
and Manhattan, the initial postconviction review typically is performed by a 
prosecutor who is the third most senior in the office or a member of the district 
attorney’s management team.243 At that level of seniority and with the established 
credibility attendant to that position, the reviewer is likely to be less concerned 
about potential professional consequences resulting from unwinding a conviction, 
and her conclusions are much more likely to carry weight among line prosecutors 
and the district attorney. In addition, as someone who is in a supervisory position 
and therefore is frequently required to evaluate and review other prosecutors’ 
performance, a senior prosecutor is less likely to be swayed by peer pressure and 
the social hazards inherent in investigating a colleague’s conviction. Indeed, a 
long-time prosecutor who has reached the senior ranks of the office likely has 
experience engaging in postmortem review of other prosecutors’ mistakes or 
                                                     
within their office, however, requiring that the prosecutor be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. See, e.g., Vance, Jr., supra note 107. 
238 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012). 
239 MEDWED, supra note 119, at 127–28. 
240 Medwed, supra note 8, at 175–76.  
241 The danger exists that conviction integrity units may be viewed by prosecutors as 
an office “inspector general”—someone constantly looking over prosecutors’ shoulders 
and second-guessing their discretionary choices. See id.at 176.  
242 Id. at 134–37, 156–57, 176. 
243 See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; 
Meet the Executive Team, supra note 123; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.  
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alleged misconduct. Perhaps most importantly, a senior prosecutor—particularly 
the third most senior in the office—has direct access to the district attorney, which 
ensures that her conclusions regarding guilt or innocence are not filtered by others 
who may have conflicting incentives with regard to the case being investigated. 
Of course, having an experienced prosecutor engage in postconviction review 
comes with its own potential hazards. To be sure, if cynicism is a problem among 
prosecutors who review stacks of frivolous innocence claims, presumably a more 
senior prosecutor, who has spent more years watching the guilty claim innocence, 
would experience a higher degree of innate skepticism. It may be more difficult 
under those circumstances for that person to review an innocence claim with the 
objectivity and detachment necessary to detect actual innocence. It is for this 
reason that some have suggested the use of outside advisory committees to review 
postconviction claims of innocence,244 and this is perhaps why Dallas County uses 
defense lawyers to head its conviction integrity unit. On the other hand, most 
prosecutors’ offices across the country lack the resources to hire someone from 
outside the office to engage in postconviction review.245 Moreover, bringing in 
someone from the outside—and particularly a defense lawyer—to engage in an 
oversight function over career prosecutors may result not only in morale problems 
and division within the office (given the traditional cultural-adversarial divide 
between prosecutors and defense lawyers), but it may make line prosecutors more 
resistant to postconviction review than they would be if the process were being 
directed by an experienced prosecutor whom they respected.246 Indeed, the 
importance of having a senior, highly respected prosecutor leading the 
postconviction review process was a common refrain among conviction integrity 
unit directors.247 Most of the conviction integrity unit prosecutors considered a 
seasoned prosecutor to be better positioned to assess the validity of an earlier 
conviction and more likely to have that prosecutor’s conclusions regarding guilt or 
innocence respected by other prosecutors in the office, and, for that reason, better 
able to create the culture of innocence seeking necessary to achieve an effective 
postconviction review process.248 Whether it is a senior prosecutor or a seasoned 
criminal defense lawyer at the helm, having a well-respected lawyer with high-
level office authority leading any postconviction effort is essential to that effort’s 
success. 
 
B.  Tiered Review 
 
The three principles outlined above are essential to a strong postconviction 
review regime, but without a well-defined set of standards to guide the review 
process itself, postconviction review may still be subject to prosecutorial biases. 
                                                     
244 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
245 See Burns Interview, supra note 200. 
246 See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
247 See id.; Angel Interview, supra note 146. 
248 See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
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This section creates a clear set of guidelines to direct prosecutorial discretion, a 
framework that instructs prosecutors on when additional investigation is 
appropriate, when they should drop opposition to a petition claiming innocence, 
and when their ethical obligations require active support of an innocence claim. 
Standardized review is essential to an effective postconviction review process;249 
where prosecutors have no articulable standard to guide their discretion, the justice 
they administer is likely to vary case by case, based on the prosecutor who reviews 
it. Where prosecutors rely solely on their instincts to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of a case, inherent biases are more likely to play a role in decision 
making, and racial and socio-economic inequity is more likely to result.250  
Such standards are notably absent from the conviction integrity units 
discussed above. Instead, the effectiveness, efficiency, and accuracy of the 
postconviction review process rely entirely on the appropriately exercised 
discretion of prosecutors.251 In describing how each determined what petitions to 
support, prosecutors used expressions like “you know it when you see it,” “when it 
keeps you up at night,” and “no scientific formula.”252 But the problem with the 
“you know it when you see it” standard in this context is that the convicted 
innocent quite often are in jail because they appeared to be guilty in the first 
instance—indeed, the original prosecutor may likewise have become convinced of 
guilt based on a gut instinct. Only a small fraction of wrongful convictions are a 
product of prosecutorial misconduct.253 Far more often, wrongful convictions 
occur because well-meaning, dedicated, hard-working prosecutors simply fail to 
detect the flaws in their cases.254 This mistake is even more likely in the 
postconviction context, where convictions are stamped with the authority of a 
previous prosecutor, a jury, and often multiple rounds of judges (on appeal and in 
habeas) and where there are a variety of other incentives toward upholding a 
conviction that the prosecutor may not even detect affecting her judgment.255  
The framework below—derived by combining the experience of conviction 
integrity units with the experience of convicted innocents—is a first step at 
                                                     
249 See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
250 As Angela Davis has observed, unfettered prosecutorial discretion lends itself to 
discrimination and inconsistent justice. See DAVIS, supra note 52, at 5. 
251 The Dallas Conviction Integrity Unit has been run since its inception by 
prosecutors who spent their career as criminal defense lawyers, and for that reason they 
bring to the job a unique set of biases that in some cases may vary fairly dramatically from 
those of the typical prosecutor. See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
252 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Valentini Interview, supra note 175; 
Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111. 
253 See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 208. 
254 See MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25. 
255 See id.; Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 516–20 (2007) (outlining ways in which cognitive bias affects 
prosecutors); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 183–86 (2007) (exploring prosecutorial passion as an 
influence on prosecutors’ decisions in plea bargaining). 
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prescribing a comprehensive standard for prosecutors’ offices to apply in 
reviewing postconviction cases. There is certain to be disagreement among 
prosecutors and among scholars as to which standard of proof strikes the 
appropriate balance between the need to ferret out the convicted innocent and the 
need to protect the many other important functions served by this nation’s 
prosecutors. Most important, though, is that prosecutors adopt some clear 
framework to govern prosecutorial discretion, and the below proposal is an attempt 
to begin a conversation on how the specific contours of that framework should 
look. 
 
1.  Initial Screening Procedures and When Investigation Is Warranted: Stating a 
Claim of Innocence 
 
A cost-effective middle ground for identifying the convicted innocent without 
wasting prosecutorial resources would require an inmate to state a claim of actual 
innocence by pointing to either some new evidence not presented to the jury 
(broadly defined) or a sufficiently serious allegation of misconduct that one might 
question the integrity of the criminal justice process the petitioner received, a 
factor that would increase the likelihood that an actually innocent individual had 
been convicted.256 Where an inmate “states a claim” of this nature, further 
investigation is warranted.257 And where the underlying case bears the red flags of 
a wrongful conviction, prosecutors should employ detailed checklists to ensure no 
new evidence is overlooked.258 Moreover, conviction integrity prosecutors cast a 
                                                     
256 Santa Clara also reviews a third category of cases: those brought to its attention by 
credible, well-respected defense counsel. See Angel Interview, supra note 146. There is no 
doubt that concerns expressed by reputable, experienced defense counsel about a 
conviction can be a good indicator of a wrongful conviction. Nevertheless, announcing a 
policy of investigating “reputable” defense counsel concerns raises at least two problems: 
(1) prosecutors will end up engaging in their own ad hoc evaluation of credibility—
meaning that in some instances compliant defense counsel will be rewarded with 
postconviction attention while defense counsel less willing to “play nice” will not, and (2) 
defense counsel will begin to interpret their duty to represent their clients zealously to 
include an obligation to raise a pro forma innocence claim with the local district attorney’s 
office. Neither of these scenarios would help conserve resources or serve justice. 
257 Other innocence-inquiry bodies employ a similar or slightly lower standard. In 
England, the Criminal Cases Review Commission engages in a screening for “bare 
eligibility”—namely, that the conviction occurred within its jurisdiction and that all appeals 
be exhausted. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 491 & n.137. Likewise, the North 
Carolina Innocence Commission conducts an initial screening to determine whether the 
petitioner is claiming complete factual innocence based on “credible” and “verifiable” 
evidence that had not previously been heard. Id. at 492. 
258 Research suggests that lawyers can be “primed” to focus on certain aspects of their 
identity (e.g., a prosecutor’s “minister of justice” role) through reflection and can in this 
way neutralize cognitive biases that may otherwise impact their decision making. See 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 
45–47 (2009). For that reason, careful review of a checklist—and the reflection doing so 
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wide net in the claims they are willing to review, even considering claims where 
statutes of limitations have expired, where petitioners have no postconviction 
recourse left, and where individuals have pled guilty or state statutes of limitations 
on their ability to claim innocence have run. 
Where a petitioner articulates some sort of discernible innocence claim, 
conviction integrity units engage in further screening to determine whether 
investigation is needed,259 most often by pulling the individual’s case file and 
communicating with the individual or her attorney by phone or letter, a process 
that is not terribly time intensive.260 In the case of Harris County, where this 
screening indicates the potential for forensic evidence that may be persuasive on 
the question of guilt or innocence, further investigation will be conducted.261 
Dallas County imposes a threshold question of whether the innocence claim (or 
other information in the prosecutor’s possessions) indicates the potential for new 
exculpatory evidence, a standard it equates with the required Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) showing in civil cases: Does the applicant state a cognizable 
innocence claim?262 If the answer is affirmative, the office undertakes further 
investigation. 
Imposing a “new evidence” requirement for additional investigation makes 
sense from the perspectives of conserving resources, respecting finality, and 
deferring to a jury verdict, but it only makes sense from the perspective of freeing 
the convicted innocent if the term “new evidence” is broadly defined. For instance, 
evidence that could have or should have been discovered by diligent trial counsel 
does not qualify as “new evidence” under some state innocence statutes.263 In the 
realm of wrongful conviction, one cannot assume diligent defense counsel.264 In 
Harry Miller’s case, for instance, Miller—who ultimately was wrongfully 
convicted of robbery—had a virtually irrefutable alibi that his attorney was aware 
of, but defense counsel nevertheless failed to call witnesses that could substantiate 
                                                     
entails—may allow prosecutors to neutralize the cognitive biases that may result in a 
reflexive decision that an individual is guilty. 
259 Many of the letters prosecutors receive never require prosecutors to pull a case file 
or call the claimant in prison because many do not allege factual (or “actual”) innocence, 
but rather they complain about prison conditions or the sentence received or attempt to 
reargue the evidence presented to the jury at trial. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, 
at 512. According to former Dallas County Conviction Integrity Director Mike Ware, 
during his tenure, at least 25% of the claims his office received had nothing to do with 
factual innocence and could be dismissed with no further effort. See id. at 512 n.259. When 
it is unclear whether a factual claim of innocence is being made, these offices often call the 
inmate or send a letter requesting further information, a low-cost process that typically 
screens out additional petitioners. See id.; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
260 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 
83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
261 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
262 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 512 & n.258. 
263 See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1671 (2008). 
264 See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 10, 165–67; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 
41–43 (recognizing the role of inadequate defense counsel in wrongful conviction). 
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the alibi, relying instead upon Miller’s testimony alone.265 While the testimony of 
these witnesses was not “new” or newly discovered in the postconviction phase, 
that testimony demonstrated clearly Miller’s innocence and was evidence that the 
jury that convicted him never heard.266 The United States’s indigent defense 
system is populated by a significant number of skilled, under-paid, diligent defense 
counsel, but it also contains a number of defense attorneys who are not diligent and 
whose lack of commitment to criminal cases is only exacerbated by local and state 
governments’ refusal to adequately pay defense counsel.267 Given the deficiencies 
of the U.S. indigent defense system, it is not realistic to assume trial counsel 
diligence in determining whether evidence qualifies as “new.” 
Just as an assumption of trial counsel diligence makes little sense when 
identifying the convicted innocent, another common “new evidence” requirement 
in state innocence statutes—that to qualify as “new” the evidence must be 
admissible—would deny exoneration to many of the wrongfully convicted and 
would put prosecutors in a difficult moral dilemma. There is a great deal of 
inadmissible evidence that may influence a prosecutor’s decision to charge an 
individual and likewise a great deal of inadmissible evidence that may influence 
his or her belief regarding an inmate’s guilt or innocence;268 this evidence should 
influence prosecutorial judgment in both instances. Special Assistant District 
Attorney Angel enunciated a “new evidence” standard that strikes a balance 
between respecting the finality of a jury verdict, the importance of conserving 
investigative resources for meritorious cases, and the need to actually exonerate the 
wrongfully convicted: there “has to be some new evidence that was not presented 
to [the] jury already or some really legitimate allegation of misconduct of some 
sort—(such as the) evidence was there, but something went so wrong that we can’t 
trust [the criminal justice] process.”269  
 
2.  When Actual Innocence Claims Warrant Further Investigation: A Bona Fide 
Dispute as to Guilt 
 
Knowing how far to proceed in the investigation process is far more 
challenging than making the discrete decision to engage in an investigation. In the 
preconviction context, the Model Rules are silent with regard to investigative 
directives, and even the more aspirational ABA Prosecution Function Standards 
discuss investigation in terms of proscriptions (e.g., avoiding invidious 
discrimination and use of illegal means to investigate) rather than prescriptions for 
                                                     
265 See Stephen Dark, An Innocent Man, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/article-35-14164-an-innocent-man.html?current_page=1. 
266 Id. 
267 See generally JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 171–73, 201 
(2007) (discussing Virginia’s notoriously underfunded indigent defense system). 
268 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 500. 
269 Angel Interview, supra note 146. 
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aspirational ethical conduct.270 While the question involves a significant degree of 
prosecutorial discretion, one clear guideline prosecutors can apply in deciding 
whether to continue to pursue exculpatory evidence is to question whether a bona 
fide issue as to the guilt of the petitioner still exists.271 If one views the decision to 
investigate in the first place as tied to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)-
type standard, the decision to terminate an investigation could be seen to turn on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): the investigation ends when there remains 
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”272 
Of course, knowing whether a dispute is “genuine” is the challenge in these 
cases, a challenge exacerbated by the fact that often the postconviction 
investigation occurs ten, twenty, or thirty years after the crime originally was 
committed. Conducting an investigation years after the fact poses very serious 
challenges. Witnesses may no longer be available, and some evidence not 
preserved. Prosecutors may be called upon to make credibility determinations with 
regard to recanting witnesses and, in doing so, are forced to engage in some degree 
of second-guessing the jury that initially heard and believed those witnesses’ 
testimonies.273 Witness recollections—unreliable under even the best circum-
stances—are likely to be further weakened by the passage of time.274 For that 
reason, prosecutors must question how much weight to give a jury verdict vis-à-vis 
their own objective assessment of the postconviction state of the evidence. There is 
inherent subjectivity in this type of assessment, which is why Harris County limits 
its postconviction review to only those cases where objective, definitive forensic 
evidence of innocence exists.275 
Limiting postconviction review to only forensically resolvable cases, 
however, would knock out a significant number of cases where individuals clearly 
merit exoneration. Thomas Haynesworth, the exonerated defendant mentioned in 
the Introduction, would not be a free man under this standard. And while 
nonforensic new evidence poses an exponentially larger challenge for investigators 
and prosecutors, there are objective indicia prosecutors can look to in assessing a 
petitioner’s claim of innocence: consistency in accounts;276 the credibility of the 
                                                     
270 See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 3-3.1 to 3-3.11 (3d ed. 1993), available at http://ww 
w.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_d 
efense_function.authcheckdam.pdf 
271 This standard is a variation on one found in the Utah innocence statute, under 
which, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must demonstrate a “bona fide 
issue as to whether the petitioner is factually innocent.” Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 743, 747 
(Utah Ct. App. 2010) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(6)(b)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2009)). 
272 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
273 See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
274 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 48, 72 (referencing the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony and the unreliability of long-term memory). 
275 See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. 
276 See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
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petitioner; untested DNA evidence or DNA evidence for which there now exist 
improved testing techniques;277 or trial testimony of questionable forensic accuracy 
(e.g., hair comparison, fingerprint analysis, or blood-typing). Indeed, prosecutors 
can and should inform their nonforensic investigations by educating their attorneys 
and investigators on the typical hallmarks of wrongful conviction.278 Prosecutors 
should engage in the search for evidence of innocence with the same diligence 
with which they would search for evidence of guilt pretrial, but because they only 
need worry about convincing their office—not a jury—they can end an 
investigation where they become sufficiently convinced of the inmate’s innocence. 
As in the pretrial context, detailed checklists may serve an important role in 
ensuring that an investigation covers all necessary bases and does not fall prey to 
tunnel vision. Likewise, training prosecutor office investigators, local police, and 
the local crime lab on common mistakes that lead to wrongful conviction and how 
to identify such convictions may well help these individuals avoid confirmatory 
bias when engaging in postconviction review. Such training also serves to 
streamline and reduce the costs of the investigation process—ensuring that not 
only prosecutors, but their investigators, know what to look for and how to do so 
efficiently.  
Estimating the added costs of engaging in this type of investigation is 
impossible, because regimes will vary depending upon the caseload and 
willingness to pay of each jurisdiction, as well as each office’s evidence retention 
policies (those offices that do not retain evidence from old cases are necessarily 
limited in their ability to reinvestigate old cases). Of the conviction integrity units 
discussed above, Dallas County and Harris County employ two attorneys who 
work full time on the postconviction review process, typically one senior and one 
more junior prosecutor.279 While Dallas County was able to obtain additional 
funding to initiate its postconviction program, Harris County simply had to divert 
resources from other office programs.280 One could estimate the additional cost for 
hiring additional prosecutors, plus a full-time investigator as most programs 
                                                     
277 Id. Of course, New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance has observed that 
in the two years that the county’s conviction integrity unit has functioned, it has not 
encountered any cases in which exonerating DNA evidence existed. See Vance, Jr., supra 
note 107. 
278 See Cynthia E. Jones, supra note 46, at 2927–29 (identifying four “leading causes 
of wrongful convictions”). There is a significant volume of high-quality scholarship 
exploring the common causes of wrongful convictions and identifying eyewitness 
identification, confessions, government informant testimony, and non-DNA forensic 
analysis of physical evidence as some of the most prevalent causes. That discussion is 
outside the scope of this Article, but in the past five years, there have been several very 
interesting statistical analyses done on this topic. See generally GARRETT, supra note 19; 
GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5; PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6.  
279 Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. Cf. 
Valentini Interview, supra note 175 (employing four attorneys). 
280 See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; 
Wilson Interview, supra note 59. Cook County also found a way to fund the program 
internally, without any additional resources. See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
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have,281 but adopting a full conviction integrity unit is simply not practical for the 
majority of district attorneys’ offices across the country,282 particularly given the 
public’s well-documented underfunding of programs that benefit the 
incarcerated.283 Postconviction review in other places is bound to look much 
different. Prosecutors can ration the diversion of resources from ongoing cases to 
these types of postconviction investigations by tackling innocence claims on a 
triage basis, with the most serious offenses and longest-incarcerated defendants’ 
cases taken up first. Indeed, this is standard practice for some conviction integrity 
units.284 
While the costs of postconviction investigation are significant, postconviction 
investigations do have some innate efficiencies over those conducted pretrial. In 
the pretrial context, police detectives conduct the investigation, select a suspect, 
and then present the results of their investigation to a prosecutor—a process that 
often transfers investigative tunnel vision to prosecutorial tunnel vision.285 In the 
postconviction context, the prosecutor actively directs the investigation from 
beginning to end (often through its own investigators in offices that employ those). 
For that reason, prosecutors have a unique ability to ensure that resources are 
directed only toward the specific nodes of a case that may point toward innocence. 
And, of course, while police officers often operate without immediate legal 
direction indicating when and whether they have met their burden of proof, where 
prosecutors direct an investigation, they can expand or stop the investigation 
immediately when the standards set forth in this framework have been met. For 
instance, where prosecutors are able to confirm guilt (such as by receiving a 
confirmatory DNA analysis) or to confirm the lack of a bona fide issue (such as by 
finding definitive evidence contradicting a petitioner’s specific innocence claim or 
discovering his or her story directly contradicted by multiple other credible 
witnesses in the case), they should conclude the investigation. 
More importantly, though, the dollars spent on investigation may result in 
equivalent savings in litigation costs—regardless of whether the investigation 
reveals additional evidence of innocence or guilt. In the face of an explosion of 
postconviction habeas and actual innocence claims, prosecutors’ typical response 
is to review the case file and the transcripts of a case and refute the petitioner’s 
claims on that basis. This may be effective in securing a speedy dismissal where a 
petitioner is pro se, but in cases with some merit or where the Innocence Project, 
pro bono counsel, or diligent defense counsel is involved, the litigation may take 
years or be accompanied by bruising media attention, and the petitioner may have 
to work through not only habeas requests, but requests for DNA testing, actual 
                                                     
281 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 
83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
282 See Burns Interview, supra note 200. 
283 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 570 n.242 (2001). 
284 See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Valentini Interview, supra note 175. 
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innocence petitions, and then litigation over wrongful conviction compensation.286 
Some hotly contested cases could be far more quickly disposed of if the 
prosecution discovered more conclusive evidence of guilt. Further, many of these 
cases could be disposed of far more quickly—and without the added years of 
litigation costs, media embarrassment, and wrongful incarceration—by an up-front 
investment in independent investigation. No doubt prosecutorial funds will be 
spent investigating more meritless claims of innocence than meritorious ones; but 
overall, the costs of proactively exploring guilt or innocence may be smaller than 
the costs of reactively claiming guilt until the petitioner can prove otherwise. And, 
of course, this cost-effective response has the added benefit of better serving 
justice, which is the primary mission of the prosecutor’s office. 
Postconviction review also promises to generate preconviction efficiencies. 
The discovery of valid innocence claims through postconviction review 
communicates unequivocally to line prosecutors that wrongful conviction occurs 
and, further, educates them on the warning signs of a potential wrongful 
conviction. This in turn improves investigative practices, trial strategy, and office 
disclosure policies. As Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins observed 
about his conviction integrity unit, “What we’ve created is a laboratory where we 
can study the failure of the system.”287 Use of lessons learned from that laboratory 
may help prosecutors’ offices weed out indictments that should be dismissed and 
prosecutors who are not taking seriously their ethical obligation to uphold 
justice,288 and it may even reveal a pattern of inadequate Brady observance that 
may require revision of office practices on the front end of the criminal justice 
system. The office education on wrongful conviction that is likely to accompany 
adoption of a standardized review framework therefore offers not only to reduce 
the incidence of wrongful conviction, but it also offers to reduce resources wasted 
                                                     
286 See, e.g., Dark, supra note 265; Wade Goodwyn, Free After 25 Years: A Tale of 
Murder and Injustice, NPR (Apr. 28, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/28/150 
996459/free-after-25-years-a-tale-of-murder-and-injustice?ps=rs; Brandi Grissom, William-
son Prosecutor Asserts a Change of Heart, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/11/18/us/williamson-prosecutor-john-bradley-has-a-change-of-heart.ht 
ml?_r=1&pagewanted=all%22%20%5Co%20%22Times%20article (summarizing Michael 
Morton’s long battle for exoneration, which included requests for case files and DNA 
testing, followed by a request for an innocence petition); Emiley Morgan, After Being 
Imprisoned for 3 1/2 Years, Man Exonerated in 2003 Robbery, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 12, 
2011, 1:29 PM) http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705390718/ After-being-imprisoned-
for-3-12-years-man-exonerated-in-2003-robbery.html?pg=2 (detai-ling Harry Miller’s long 
battle for exoneration, which included a contested appeal, a petition for actual innocence, 
and ultimately the pursuit of compensation). 
287 Leslie Wimmer, Dallas County DA Speaks to Fort Worth Community, FORT 
WORTH BUS. PRESS (July 20, 2010, 5:12 PM) http://fwbusinesspress55.1upprelaunch.com/ 
main.asp?SectionID=18&SubSectionID=43&ArticleID=12597.  
288 See MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25 (discussing various cognitive biases that 
naturally occur in police investigation and criminal prosecution, including “confirmation 
bias” or “expectancy bias” and “belief perseverance,” that tend to contribute to tunnel 
vision on the part of police and prosecutors); Medwed, supra note 8, at 139–40.  
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on investigating the wrong suspect or conducting trials that are likely to end in 
acquittals or mistrials. In other words, postconviction review, and the lessons 
learned from it, promise future preconviction savings. 
 
3.  When Actual Innocence Claims Require a Prosecutor to Drop Opposition to 
Release: A Reasonable Likelihood of Innocence 
 
Once an investigation is concluded, the prosecutor faces the thorny question 
of what to do and what her ethical obligations require when doubts remain about 
the conviction’s validity. Model Rule 3.8(h) suggests that a prosecutor should 
“seek to remedy the conviction” when “clear and convincing evidence” shows the 
defendant was wrongfully convicted.289 Green and Yaroshefsky consider the 
Model Rules standard too high and assert that a prosecutor should seek an inmate’s 
release upon determining that the defendant is “probably innocent.”290 While it is 
certainly true that “the state and federal government have an obligation to free 
innocent individuals,”291 a question remains regarding how much certainty is 
required for prosecutors to advocate for release and whether a lesser level of 
certainty would counsel prosecutors to defer to postconviction judicial processes. 
This would passively allow convicted individuals to free themselves by not 
opposing such efforts, rather than bringing the full weight of the executive to bear 
in favor of their release. This Article suggests a difference between those two 
actions on the part of the government, and while Green and Yaroshefsky make a 
compelling case that the “probably innocent” standard is sufficient for dropping 
prosecutorial opposition to postconviction claims of innocence, a higher degree of 
certainty may be required for active prosecutorial attempts to secure exoneration. 
The “probably innocent” standard that Green and Yaroshefsky propose, which 
seems to be roughly equivalent to a “reasonable likelihood of innocence” 
standard,292 may trigger a moral obligation on the part of the prosecutor not to 
oppose release,293 but it seems to fall short of the level of conviction required to 
campaign for the release of someone who was convicted by a jury and whose 
conviction was upheld by multiple judges. Given the far cry from anything 
approximating certainty that “probably innocent” denotes, it may not be in the best 
interest of society, finality, justice, or a prosecutor’s political reputation to actively 
seek to free or exonerate that individual. While, as discussed below, state statutory 
innocence standards need not bind prosecutors, where they are only 51% 
                                                     
289 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h) (2013). 
290 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 508. 
291 Id. at 505. 
292 Id. at 516 (“When a prosecutor concludes that a convicted defendant is reasonably 
likely to be innocent, the appropriate steps may vary depending on the jurisdiction . . . .”); 
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2013) (imposing an investigatory 
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reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the 
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293 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 516. 
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convinced of innocence, justice may be better served by deferring to the criminal 
justice process, the jury verdict, and postconviction judicial review procedures 
rather than substituting an uncertain prosecutor’s opinion for their judgments. 
Conviction integrity prosecutors spoke frequently about the challenge of respecting 
a jury verdict while engaging in postconviction review.294 Where new evidence 
causes a prosecutor to doubt a conviction, but further investigation leaves that 
prosecutor only with the conclusion that the individual is “probably innocent,” 
there is still a very good chance that the convicted individual is, in fact, guilty. A 
prosecutor should only seek to keep someone in prison when convinced of that 
person’s guilt—just as a prosecutor should only seek to convict an individual of 
whose guilt the prosecutor is convinced295—but a higher standard is required for 
that prosecutor to actively work toward that individual’s release.296 
 
4.  When Actual Innocence Claims Require a Prosecutor to Affirmatively Assist in 
Release: The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard 
 
As discussed above, there can be a significant difference in both outcome and 
perception when a prosecutor’s office calls for an individual’s exoneration versus 
when a prosecutor drops opposition to an actual innocence petition, and for that 
reason, it makes sense that a different standard of proof would attach to one 
outcome over the other. Under Model Rule 3.8(h), a prosecutor must seek to 
“remedy” a conviction when “clear and convincing evidence” establishes existence 
of a wrongful conviction.297 Of course, under the Model Rules, the steps necessary 
to meet this duty to “remedy” are not, in fact, all that onerous:  
 
Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, 
requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent 
defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor 
                                                     
294 See, e.g., Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Valentini Interview, supra note 
175; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. 
295 See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 60 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (May 1988). 
296 The ethical challenges associated with determining whether to support a 
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297 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h) (2013). 
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has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which 
the defendant was convicted.298 
 
While these suggested steps may be appropriate to avoid disciplinary action, the 
presence of “clear and convincing evidence” actually dictates a more robust 
response for prosecutors committed to serving justice.  
Setting a higher standard for active prosecutorial support is appropriate both 
from normative and efficiency perspectives. Normatively speaking, the prosecutor 
acts as an official representative of the U.S. government. The United States 
Supreme Court explained in Berger v. United States:299 
 
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.300  
 
In other words, the actions of a prosecutor carry with them the imprimatur of the 
sovereign—which is one reason prosecutors are so powerful in the postconviction 
context. By actively seeking the release of a convicted individual, by joining a 
motion with the defense as the government did with Haynesworth and Odom, the 
government is sending the message—as it expressly did in those cases—that those 
individuals are actually innocent.301 That mea culpa on the part of the government 
is not warranted where an individual is “probably innocent” or there is a 
“reasonable likelihood” of innocence. 
Employing a “clear and convincing” standard for active government support 
is important also from an efficiency and cost perspective. First, given the official 
mea culpa that attends a joint motion with the government, such motions 
ultimately may form the basis for a petition for wrongful incarceration 
compensation. Given the significance of the payout that can result, prosecutors 
should be convinced of an individual’s innocence prior to officially acknowledging 
such innocence. Second, affirmative support of a petition requires an expenditure 
of time on the part of the prosecutor’s office—far more so than nonopposition to 
an actual innocence or habeas petition would—and an expenditure of political and 
public capital.  
Applying a “probable” innocence standard would likely mean that some 
portion of the time prosecutors will be expending government resources to free an 
individual who is guilty. Advocating for such individuals on the basis of just over 
50% certainty may cause division within a prosecutor’s office, potentially 
                                                     
298 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 8 (2013). 
299 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
300 Id. at 88. 
301 See also Medwed, supra note 5, at 1559 (“Exonerations may also result from 
prosecutors joining in a defense request to free the inmate prior to a fullfledged evidentiary 
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generating resentment toward the postconviction review process and skepticism 
toward the concept of “wrongful conviction.” Pitching innocence to a governor’s 
office where prosecutors have no “clear and convincing evidence” at which to 
point may also reduce the prosecutors’ credibility with the governor’s office, 
where typically a very high standard for innocence is required.302 Finally, 
exonerating the “probably innocent” may sacrifice the public’s trust in the criminal 
justice system. Where prosecutors are not completely convinced, the public also is 
not likely to be completely convinced, and therefore applying supporting 
innocence on the basis of “probability” may engender public distrust in the 
criminal justice system. In addition, where prosecutors are not clearly convinced of 
innocence, they risk being held personally responsible for freeing criminals who 
may ultimately commit further crime. Indeed, in hotly contested district attorney 
elections, any question regarding the certainty of someone’s innocence prior to 
exoneration can become a campaign issue.303 Not only is this potential outcome 
problematic in terms of public safety, but it also risks triggering public backlash 
against the exoneration movement, a move clearly counterproductive to justice. 
 
IV.  THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF RESOLVING THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S 
DILEMMA 
 
Of course, as with any proposal, the structural modifications and the concept 
of tiered review will not eliminate entirely the problem they address. Nor is 
perfection the criterion required to assess the proposal’s utility. That said, an open 
question remains regarding whether prosecutors’ offices are likely to adopt a tiered 
innocence analysis framework, particularly in the absence of a model rule that sets 
disciplinary consequences for failing to meet a certain standard of postconviction 
conduct.  
While there may be a will to adopt postconviction review procedures in large 
cities with liberal district attorneys, like Manhattan and Dallas, one might wonder 
whether implementing postconviction review is a realistic possibility in those 
jurisdictions where adversarial culture is most entrenched and where skepticism 
toward innocence claims is at its highest. These are the offices where wrongful 
conviction is most likely and where exoneration is most difficult.304 For those 
offices where allegations of actual innocence are viewed most skeptically, where 
prosecutors are most adamant that current office practices are sufficient to ensure 
that wrongful convictions do not occur,305 and where aggressive prosecutorial 
                                                     
302 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 485–87. 
303 See, e.g., Jennifer Emily, Attorneys Who Oppose Craig Watkins’ Re-Election as 
Dallas County District Attorney Fault Actions of His Conviction Integrity Unit, DALLAS 
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culture is so entrenched that a sea change toward a “minister of justice” mentality 
seems most impossible,306 an embarrassing high-profile wrongful conviction may 
be most likely. These types of incidents have in some instances created dramatic 
pressure for reform, even in districts previously adamant about the frivolousness of 
postconviction review, and they may be sufficient to force prosecutors to embrace 
a postconviction review system. For other prosecutors’ offices, an evolution 
toward adopting a postconviction review framework is likely to be more gradual. 
But either way, the widespread adoption of postconviction review procedures is 
not only realistic, but the politics of wrongful conviction are pushing prosecutors 
in that direction, some swiftly and others gradually. 
 
A.  The Case for Dramatic Near-Future Reform 
 
Almost all of the conviction integrity units discussed above were formed in 
the wake of a public crisis of confidence in the district attorney’s office. In Dallas 
County and Cook County, a series of embarrassing public exonerations galvanized 
public attention to the need for postconviction reform, essentially requiring a 
dramatic sea change in how prosecutors review and respond to postconviction 
claims of innocence.307 Indeed, conviction integrity has become a hot topic in 
district attorney elections across the country, and a particularly popular campaign 
promise in counties that have experienced one or more high-profile exonerations in 
recent history.308 Brooklyn DA Kenneth Thompson vowed to resolve an alleged 
crisis of wrongful convictions during his campaign.309 
In Lake County, Illinois, the 2012 Democratic candidate for state attorney 
made his proposed conviction integrity unit the centerpiece of his campaign.310 In 
some elections, like that which brought Dallas County’s Craig Watkins to office, 
                                                     
not need a formal conviction integrity unit because “[m]y whole office is an integrity 
unit”). 
306 See, e.g., Graczyk, supra note 81 (discussing the legacy of Henry Wade, Dallas 
County district attorney for thirty-six years, which in recent years has included nineteen 
proven wrongful convictions and significant allegations of prosecutorial misconduct). 
Some claimed Wade’s office had a “cowboy kind of mentality,” though his son disputed 
the characterization, explaining that Wade was simply “very competitive.” Id.  
307 See supra Parts II.A.1, 5. 
308 See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Cynic, Optimist Examine Alvarez’ New Philosophy, CHICAGO 
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/20 
12/02/alvarez-to-partner-with-advocates.html (connecting Cook County District Attorney 
Alvarez’s recent adoption of a conviction integrity unit with media attention for failure to 
reexamine a 2004 case, a dozen exonerations that have occurred since she took office in 
2008, and the fact that she is currently running for reelection).  
309 Oren Yaniv, Brooklyn DA Kenneth Thompson Off to Slow Start at Fixing Wrongful 
Convictions, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc- 
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310 See Chris Kennedy, Lake County State’s Attorney, ABC EYEWITNESS NEWS, http:// 
abclocal.go.com/wls/feature?section=news/politics/local_elections&id=8800657 (last visit-
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public outrage surrounding a high-profile wrongful conviction has been decisive, 
paving the way for a dramatic shift in administration and office culture, even in 
traditionally conservative, adversarial prosecutor’s offices.311 
Craig Watkins won the election in Dallas County in 2007 after the county 
faced a series of embarrassing public exonerations. Although Dallas County had 
long been a conservative, tough-on-crime district, and Watkins was a defense 
attorney with no prosecutorial experience, he was elected on a platform of 
restoring public trust in the criminal justice system, the promise of improved 
conviction integrity a central tenet of his campaign.312 Dallas County had elected 
conservative, highly aggressive prosecutors for years, but the very public wrongful 
conviction problems of the county swept Watkins into office and resulted in a 
complete cultural change of that office.313 Watkins’s experience demonstrates that 
even in jurisdictions with an entrenched adversarial culture—where there is a focus 
on “winning” rather than “administering justice”314—a tidal wave of public 
opinion can effect cultural transformation. And the public often demands this type 
of transformation in the wake of particularly egregious instances of wrongful 
conviction, as seen in Dallas County in 2007 and more recently in Williamson 
County, another Texas county still reeling from a high-profile exoneration 
vigorously resisted by the district attorney.315 
                                                     
311 See, e.g., Brandi Grissom, Morton Case Is Focus of Williamson County DA Race, 
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313 Radley Balko, Is This America’s Best Prosecutor?, REASON.COM (Apr. 7, 2008), 
http://reason.com/archives/2008/04/07/is-this-americas-best-prosecut (noting the firing of 
nine top-level prosecutors); Graczyk, supra note 81. Immediately upon taking office, 
Watkins removed prosecutors from the previous administration who were perceived to lack 
Watkins’s commitment to reforming office practices, while others left voluntarily. Wilson 
Interview, supra note 59. 
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315 John Bradley, the district attorney of Williamson County, Texas, recently lost his 
bid for reelection due to his prominent role in resisting the innocence claim of Michael 
Morton, a man convicted in 1987 of murdering his wife and whom DNA evidence 
exonerated in 2010. See Grissom, supra note 311. Bradley was not district attorney at the 
time of the conviction but resisted for years Morton’s request for access to his case file and 
DNA testing, thereby extending Morton’s stay in prison and allowing the real killer (who 
had subsequently committed another murder) several more years of freedom. See id.; 
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Regardless of whether it occurs in a red or blue state, wrongful conviction 
tends to evoke a visceral, “this-could-happen-to-me” response that bridges 
traditional political and social divides.316 As Professor Abbe Smith observed, “at 
least in principle, protecting the innocent is one of the few things in the criminal 
justice system that everyone can agree on—the left and the right, defense lawyers 
and prosecutors, police and the public.”317 In the wrongful conviction context, the 
public is not only united by an innate sense of injustice, but by the reality that the 
prosecution’s error also allowed the perpetrator of a heinous crime to go free.318 In 
a country where the criminal justice system relies largely on elected prosecutors, 
the increasing incidences of public exonerations—and the public outrage that 
accompanies them—has triggered a dramatic change in various jurisdictions across 
the nation and promises to ensure that an increasing number of prosecutors’ offices 
will adopt postconviction review regimes. 
 
B.  An Eventual but Inevitable Tipping Point: The Case for Gradual Adoption of 
Systematized Postconviction Review 
 
Not every prosecutor’s office will encounter an embarrassing exoneration or 
become enmeshed in an election where conviction integrity is the central issue, but 
a gradual nationwide shift toward systematized postconviction review seems likely 
nevertheless. The prevalence of DNA testing statutes and innocence statutes 
ensures that prosecutors will continue to have to grapple with postconviction 
claims of innocence.319 As courts increasingly allow habeas petitioners to 
circumvent procedural defaults in the habeas context where a credible case for 
innocence has been made,320 more habeas petitioners will claim innocence, and 
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prosecutors will continue to face pressure to review and respond to these claims. 
And, of course, the number of DNA exonerations continues to rise, as the 
Innocence Project makes its way through a cache of preserved DNA evidence from 
Virginia crime labs,321 as Dallas County works its way through its own DNA 
stockpile,322 and as the Colorado Attorney General Office’s Justice Review Project 
uses federal funding to review thousands of Colorado convictions in search of 
cases that could benefit from modern DNA testing.323 These DNA cases continue 
to focus the public’s attention on the need for postconviction review, and they will 
continue to punish those prosecutors who have no standardized protocol and no 
office procedure for dealing with innocence claims. 
At some point, the stockpile of conclusive DNA exonerations will be 
exhausted, and defense lawyers and conviction-integrity-minded prosecutors will 
be left with only the murkier, more debatable, inherently inconclusive cases of 
innocence—but this eventuality only makes adoption of a standardized protocol 
more important. Non-DNA cases often do not evoke the visceral public response 
that DNA cases do because there is more likely to be a lack of consensus regarding 
guilt or innocence.324 For those prosecutors disinclined to reconsider closed 
convictions, non-DNA cases pose little threat of public embarrassment, even if the 
prosecutor responds to that claim in a way that is reflexive and unstudied. In other 
words, the abundance of non-DNA cases—the vast majority of the exoneration 
cases that remain undiscovered325—threatens to derail the steady progress toward 
standardized postconviction review that has been achieved over the past ten years. 
At the same time, these non-DNA cases, because they are far murkier and less 
conclusive than DNA cases, are just the type of case for which the review 
framework proposed above would be most useful, because these are the cases 
where a prosecutor is most likely to struggle to determine whether further 
investigation or supporting a petition is warranted. 
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323 See Associated Press, Man Convicted in Colorado Freed by DNA Evidence, 
BOSTON.COM (May 1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2012/05/ 
01/man_convicted_in_colorado_freed_by_dna_evidence/. 
324 See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1161−62 (2011). 
325 See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 11−13, 271; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 
10.  
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Regardless of what lies ahead in terms of DNA cases, the legal academy and 
the innocence movement have initiated a debate on prosecutorial postconviction 
ethics that is unlikely to abate even when DNA cases taper off. The debate over 
prosecutorial postconviction ethics initiated by Professor Fred Zacharias in 2005326 
has become a talking point for crusading district attorneys like Cyrus Vance and 
Craig Watkins.327 These prosecutors are active in their efforts to ensure that the 
issue remains on the public radar and is a topic of conversation at prosecutorial 
conferences and in the media.328  
Finally, the spread of innocence projects to law schools across the country 
ensures that postconviction justice will be part of the ethic of the next generation of 
prosecutors in this country. While law school innocence projects are not without 
their critics,329 they teach students the qualities of “thoroughness and skepticism,” 
with the skepticism being directed toward fallible forensics and the occasionally 
dysfunctional criminal justice system.330 Innocence projects are more likely to 
draw future prosecutors than traditional criminal defense clinics, because 
innocence project participants can avoid the moral choice of whether they are 
willing to represent the actually guilty331 (a choice the prosecutorially inclined may 
be less willing to make). And for those future prosecutors not directly involved in 
on-campus innocence projects, the existence of these clinical programs ensures 
they have contact with fellow students who are involved and that they hear about 
the high-profile exonerations in which these innocence projects occasionally are 
involved.332 Innocence projects across law school campuses are raising awareness 
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of wrongful conviction among the next generation of prosecutors and decreasing 
reflexive skepticism toward actual innocence claims. Whether the current 
generation of prosecutors comes to recognize the merits of systematizing 
postconviction review or not, the work of campus innocence projects is increasing 
the likelihood that postconviction review will be an important reality for the next 
generation. 
The dedicated advocacy of district attorneys like Vance and Watkins and the 
growing popularity of the innocence movement among the next generation of 
prosecutors ensure a gradual but steady evolution toward widespread adoption of 
systematized postconviction review. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The rise of DNA exonerations has triggered an explosion of postconviction 
innocence claims, one to which prosecutors across the country generally have been 
slow to respond. Although the reality of wrongful conviction is widely understood, 
most prosecutors operate from a default position of resistance to innocence claims, 
in large part because the overwhelming majority of these claims are, in fact, 
frivolous. And while prosecutors, as “ministers of justice,” are ethically obligated 
to remedy wrongful convictions, the vast majority of states lack ethical guidelines 
that mandate prosecutors do so and assist them in determining how best to do so. 
As a result, prosecutors across the country face a new dilemma: how to honor the 
prosecutor’s commitment to serving justice by identifying the convicted innocent, 
without wasting precious resources investigating largely frivolous petitions.  
This Article attempts to help prosecutors resolve that dilemma, proposing 
structural modifications to prosecutors’ offices and a concept of tiered review, or a 
standardized postconviction review regime that balances prosecutors’ ethical duties 
with the budgetary limitations prosecutors face. Drawing upon the experiences of 
five conviction integrity units, the Article identifies three key components that can 
be applied by any prosecutors’ office interested in postconviction review. It also 
identifies and remedies a notable deficiency in these conviction integrity units: the 
utter lack of any type of concrete review standard to be applied when engaging in 
the process of review. The proposal suggests clear standards of review to be used 
at each stage in the postconviction review process, calibrated to serve justice—as 
prosecutors are obligated to do—while respecting the budgetary constraints 
prosecutors face. Use of such standards is essential for ensuring consistency and 
accuracy in the review process and avoiding racial or socioeconomic 
discrimination. 
High-profile public exonerations have drawn attention to the problem of 
postconviction review and indeed have inspired institution of the conviction 
integrity units catalogued above. While some might query whether widespread 
adoption of a standardized postconviction review framework is realistic, the rise in 
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public exonerations and the increased attention prosecutors are devoting to this 
problem demonstrate how practical this type of review is. Making such review 
standard practice across the country promises to make a difference not just in 
minimizing wrongful convictions and facilitating appropriate exonerations, but 
doing so also has the potential to strengthen prosecutorial efficiency and 
effectiveness, improve the consistency of justice the accused in this country 
receive (reducing the incidence of racial and socioeconomic discrimination), and 
point prosecutors back toward their traditional role as ministers of justice. 
